

Land and politics

The Land War

The upsurge in political violence after 1879 posed a series of complex problems for the Catholic Church in Ireland. The nature of violence, its scope and scale, and its origin all presented challenges which were in many ways new. The violent protest associated with the land question after 1879 heralded, or was symptomatic of, sweeping political change. Previously, it was quite often simply a matter of condemnation for the Church. Insurrection, such as the Fenian revolt, could be dismissed as the work of a small group of malcontents or of nefarious secret societies. The Land War, however, presented an altogether different challenge. Violence was protracted and supported by a large constituency that included members of the clergy. Political violence seldom provoked a unified response from the hierarchy. Some, finding themselves in agreement with the aims of the political movements that accompanied the agitation, sought accommodation. There were others, however, for whom the violence, or the potential for violence, negated any positive response to the political changes underway.

By his own admission Logue played only a minor role in the great events which constituted the Land War. Speaking in Armagh in 1891, he told the assembled clergy of the diocese that he had never been fond of thrusting himself forward and taking the lead in political movements. He preferred, he said, to do things quietly as there were abler hands at the helm and he was quite satisfied to assist them as far as he could.¹ When the Land League was founded in 1879, Logue was a newly consecrated bishop from a minor diocese. Although secretary to the bishops' Standing Committee, he was privy to, but still removed from, the makers and shapers of policy in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, his vote was recorded at the meetings and his name was included with the other bishops on the statements issued afterward. Publicly, Logue cultivated a studiously

neutral attitude to the new political movement and the land agitation in general. It is difficult to find any statements made by him on the League or the legitimacy of the land campaign. There is evidence that he retained a great deal of sympathy with the plight of Irish tenants and even the objectives of the Land League. Privately, however, he was deeply worried by the tactics of the new movement and the involvement of the clergy in the campaign. He also bitterly resented the response of the British Government to what, at times, resembled a popular uprising.

The Land League had its origin in the disastrous economic decline in Irish agriculture after 1876. Between 1876 and 1879 the value of total Irish crop yields fell by almost £14 million. The economic downturn was worsened by a sustained period of exceptionally bad weather. In 1879, rain was recorded on two out of every three days. In the same year the potato yield was roughly a third of the normal average.² Despite the real and present threat of famine, the precarious existence of Irish smallholder tenants was exacerbated by the obligation to pay rent to their landlord. With barely enough to subsist on, paying rent and arrears proved difficult; and, by 1878, evictions on a large scale were underway in western counties.

Historians have differed as to the true nature of the land movement which sprung into existence in 1879. It has been argued that the Land League was merely the latest and most successful of the old associations and that its principal methods, the boycott and attacks on livestock and property, had been tried and tested in previous years.³ Lee has described the Land League as Europe's first truly mass movement. For the first time in Irish history, he has argued, 'the masses came onto the political stage as leading figures rather than actors.'⁴ Yet, it was not a movement dedicated to fundamental changes in the land system or Irish society as a whole in terms of proprietorship. Instead, it challenged the social and political power of the landlords by focusing on the ever-problematic relationship between landlord and tenant.⁵ Thus, as it became formalised, the League's demands centred on grievances – fair rent, fixity of tenure and freedom of sale. Some of the factions, however, which gravitated towards the movement, such as the Fenians, ensured that the potential for violent confrontation would be an inherent part of its dynamic.

The bishops met to discuss the situation in October 1879. Out of the twenty-eight members of the hierarchy there were five active supporters of the League, five willing to give support privately, nine outright opponents and nine neutrals. Larkin has recorded Logue as one of the neutrals along with James Donnelly in Clogher, Francis Kelly in Derry and Nicholas Conaty in Kilmore. The majority of those who opposed the

League outright formed a bloc around the Archbishop of Dublin, Edward McCabe, along with the Archbishop of Tuam and his coadjutor, John McEvilly in Galway. The chief supporter of the League was the brash and outspoken Archbishop of Cashel, Thomas William Croke.⁶

As the bishops struggled with the social and political challenges of the new movement, Logue threw himself into economic relief efforts in Donegal. By the end of 1879 the number of farmers facing the real prospect of famine had risen drastically and the new bishop responded with compassion and zeal. Even before national efforts got underway in December, Logue had tapped into a general enthusiasm for relief, especially in America.⁷ By January 1880 there were two central funds in Ireland for the relief of distress. The Dublin Mansion House Committee was modelled on the relief committees which had operated during the famine of the 1840s and was intended as a hub through which funds could be dispersed to committees across Ireland. The membership of the Dublin Committee included MPs, the Lord Mayor of Dublin, Edmund Dwyer Gray, and Protestant and Catholic senior clergy. A separate fund was established under the auspices of the wife of the Lord Lieutenant, the Duchess of Marlborough. Other funds included one operated by the *New York Herald* and another by the Irish community in Liverpool.

Logue presided over the first meeting of the Donegal Relief Committee on 4 January 1880. Other members of the committee included the Anglican Bishop of Derry and Raphoe, clergy from all denominations, doctors, Poor Law guardians and local merchants. The situation in Raphoe, although not the worst affected region, was sufficiently dire to demand Logue's constant attention. In the parish of St Johnstone alone, for example, the parish priest, Michael Martin, advised him that he had received applications for aid from some 1,400 people.⁸ By July 1880 the Donegal Committee was helping some 60,000 local people with money, seed, food and clothing.⁹

The distribution of aid was not without controversy. Logue received complaints from many of his priests that Catholics were being discriminated against. Michael Martin told him that the local Protestant clergy were refusing to donate at all, denying that a crisis existed. They were taking their information, he said, from the larger farmers 'who say there is no distress . . . in order to get the labour of the poor starving man and his family for little or nothing'.¹⁰ J. McKenna Edwards wrote from Belleek to inform Logue that no Catholic in the area had been assisted by the Duchess of Marlborough Relief Fund. Applicants, some 700 out of 1,000 in total, were turned away when found to be Catholic.¹¹

In a letter to the *Derry Journal* in January 1880, Logue vented his frustration at the lack of Government intervention in the crisis. 'So powerless are individual efforts and private resources to cope with the evil', he wrote, 'that I fear the best disposed and most sanguine will abandon the task in despair, leaving our people, as our leaders seem disposed to leave them, to die by the road side'.¹² He was equally scathing about the attempt of the leadership of the Land League to politicise the relief effort. At the end of 1879 Charles Stewart Parnell and John Dillon embarked on a tour of America to garner support and funding. In an interview with the *New York Herald*, Parnell accused the Duchess of Marlborough Relief Fund of giving only enough money to tenants to pay their rents. He further alleged that only those tenants who held aloof from the League were assisted.¹³ Doubts about the Mansion House Committee also surfaced with the result that, after a personal plea from Dwyer Gray, Logue published an angry letter in support of the fund. He branded the accusations from the League leadership as crimes against the famine-stricken people of Ireland. It was, he said, an even greater crime to shake the faith of the generous people of America in the various funds. 'Surely the authors of such charges', he went on, 'would be more cautious did they remember that in making them they snatched the scanty dole of charity from the mouths of weak women and helpless children'.¹⁴

Despite the controversy the League could not help being drawn into the relief effort. Indeed, the Donegal Committee benefited directly from League contributions. In January 1880, Patrick Egan, Treasurer of the Land League, sent Logue a cheque for fifty pounds. He apologised for the size of the amount but added 'with the aid of our generous countrymen in America our committee will soon be in a position to largely supplement the sum'.¹⁵ The Mansion House Committee was wound up in October and in his final report, Logue revealed that the Donegal Committee had distributed over £34,000, not including clothing and seed.¹⁶

As the economic crisis deepened, the League stepped up its activities and the leadership embarked on a radical and aggressive strategy. The 'rent at the point of a bayonet' campaign was just short of an all-out rent strike. Tenants would withhold rents to the point where they faced forcible eviction.¹⁷ In the face of what was tantamount to a general uprising, the Government responded with coercion. The Chief Secretary, W. E. Forster, told the cabinet in May 1880, 'by law, evictions must be carried out. We have no discretion as regards the humanity or moral justice of the eviction but we have simply to consider whether we allow the law to be defied or not'.¹⁸ In August a Compensations Bill which would have provided

some relief for evicted tenants was defeated in the House of Lords. The result was the trigger for an unparalleled upsurge in violence. Of the 2,585 violent crimes recorded in 1880, no fewer than 1,696 occurred after August. In response, the Government passed the Peace Preservation Act and suspended *habeas corpus*. It was believed that the sudden imprisonment of those instigating the violence would 'strike terror in a way that nothing else would'.¹⁹

The disturbances in Ireland and the growing clerical involvement in the land agitation drew the attention of the authorities in Rome. In the Irish situation, Pope Leo XIII saw an opportunity to foster links with London. The reign of his predecessor, Pius IX, had ended ignominiously with the loss of much of the papal lands in the *Risorgimento*. The temporal influence of the Holy See was at its lowest since the Reformation. Diplomatic links with Britain offered Leo the tantalising prospect of an alliance with a great power in his struggle with the Italian Government.²⁰

Roman interference began in June 1880. The Prefect of Propaganda, under whose jurisdiction the Irish Church fell, wrote to the bishops condemning their apparent disunity and ecclesiastical disorder. Cardinal Giovanni Simeoni declared that 'dissensions have gone so far that the greater part of the people has separated itself from the clergy; preferring instead the counsels of protesting'. Such a grave evil was greatly to be feared, he went on, and boded ill for the future. The Cardinal Prefect demanded unity of action among the clergy in all matters. Any dissension should be referred to the Holy See for judgement and guidance.²¹ The reason for the rebuke was helpfully explained to the Archbishop of Dublin by Tobias Kirby, Rector of the Irish College in Rome. 'The object of it', he told McCabe 'is that their Lordships should agree on a course of action and thus avoid even the semblance of dissension in their body before the public'.²² But rather than encouraging unity, Simeoni's letter merely galvanised anti-League bishops into an offensive.

The following month McCabe issued a pastoral outlining his objections to the League. He expressed sympathy with the cause of Irish tenant farmers and conceded that aspects of the land laws in Ireland constituted 'oppression'. But before God's blessing could descend on any movement, he said, it would be necessary to make certain the work engaged in was good 'and the means employed for its accomplishment must be those which have the sanction of eternal justice'.²³ On 15 October, Tobias Kirby wrote from the Irish College to inform the Archbishop of Dublin that his pastoral letter would give pleasure to all the authorities in Rome.²⁴ McCabe's views, however, did not sit well with some of his colleagues.

Patrick Duggan, the Bishop of Clonfert, told the archbishop that the Land League was an expression of the popular will and was attempting to stop the violence in the countryside.²⁵

The tempting promise of political support offered by the vocal British lobby in Rome encouraged the Pope to act again. In December 1880 Leo published a letter in the Italian press reminding the Irish clergy that the fundamental principle of the Catholic religion held that the end did not justify means which were anarchical and reprovved by conscience.²⁶ Once more, McCabe issued a pastoral criticising the League and the land campaign. He upheld Leo's warning against Irish Catholics casting aside 'the obedience due to their lawful rulers' and against besmirching the good name of Ireland with illegal acts. Justice, he went on, might be violated and a cause, 'however right in itself, might be forced by the influence of passion into the flame of sedition'.²⁷

The supporters of the League in the hierarchy, and indeed the League itself, remained undaunted by the Roman interference. Just before Leo's letter appeared in the press, the Archbishop of Cashel had written a strong letter arguing the League's case to Cardinal Simeoni. The cause was just, Croke argued, and the Irish people were strongly devoted to their religion and to the Holy See. Nine-tenths of the Irish people at home and abroad were in favour of the League, as were almost all of the junior clergy in Ireland.²⁸ The bishops' meeting in March 1881 proved a stormy affair. There was much bitterness over McCabe's unilateral pastoral and his crusade against the League.

However, there was a point around which every bishop could unite. They had been called together specifically to discuss word from Rome that the Holy See was contemplating the establishment of a papal nuncio in London. Such a move held the prospect of the Irish Church becoming subservient to a Roman representative based in Westminster. In Rome the Bishop of Ossory, Patrick Moran, had been received in audience by Monsignor Jacobini at the Secretariat of State where he was consulted about Irish reaction to the proposals. A horrified Moran immediately wrote to the primate, Daniel McGettigan, to warn the bishops of impending disaster. He argued that such a move would leave little room 'for that liberty of action in all disciplinary matters which has been the secret of the wonderful development of the Irish Church during the past fifty years'.²⁹

Before the March meeting McCabe had sounded out each bishop on the proposals. With the possible exception of McGettigan, who was rather fatalistic about the scheme, the rest of the hierarchy viewed developments in Rome with alarm.³⁰ Logue advised McCabe that he would be unable to

attend the meeting but would like his vote recorded in the negative. He argued that to subjugate the affairs of the Irish Church to a nuncio in London would be a disaster. Even the suspicion that the British Government could exert any influence over Church affairs in Ireland would create distrust and give the impression that appointments and utterances of the bishops were orchestrated by the Government and the Chief Secretary. 'I fear it would give a death blow', he argued, 'to the enthusiastic affection with which our people regard the Holy See'.³¹ On 12 March he repeated his opposition to the proposals. He told McCabe he believed they would be useful to England but ruinous for Ireland: 'It will be regarded by many as an attempt to coerce the clergy by means of the influence of Rome, just as the laity have been brought under a rule of terror by the suspension of the constitution.'³²

This was a shrewd assessment. The British lobby in Rome was already interfering in the confirmation of ecclesiastical appointments. In the end, the line suggested by Logue was almost exactly that taken by McCabe in a letter to Simeoni sent on 15 March. A nuncio in London would weaken 'if not destroy the filial confidence which has hitherto bound our people to the Holy See'. McCabe also argued that 'it would fill this country with alarm and would create in the minds of the Irish race distrust for the decisions and appointments coming to them . . . from the Holy See'.³³ A relieved Moran wrote to McCabe on 21 March to tell him that, in the face of the unified opposition of the bishops, the scheme had withered.³⁴

On the issues of the Land League and the land campaign, in public at least, Logue remained neutral. His reluctance to pronounce on the League stemmed, in part, from a lack of activity in his diocese. In January 1881, he told McCabe that agitation in Raphoe had 'not gone beyond speech-making and the passing of resolutions'.³⁵ Privately, however, he remained suspicious of the methods of the League and was concerned with the involvement of the junior clergy. In October Logue questioned his priests on the motives and activities of the Children's Land League. Father James McFadden replied that in the Derrybeg area of Donegal its activities had not gone beyond attempting to instil in children a sense of Irish history through stories and songs. He did, however, promise to keep an eye on it.³⁶ Logue was even more concerned with priests entering into public controversy in connection with the League. In November 1881, Father John Collins wrote to him to deny that he had supported the 'No Rent' manifesto issued by the League leadership from prison. 'I do not admit', Collins said, 'that I have discredited my character either as a priest or as a man by

writing and publishing letters from time to time.³⁷ His reply suggests that Logue's initial letter was one of stinging rebuke.

The 'No Rent' manifesto provided the last gasp of the Land League's campaign. In March 1881, the Liberal Government produced a Land Bill and, despite voicing concerns about the provisions therein, the committee of bishops nominated to examine it pronounced favourably.³⁸ The prospect of a settlement, however, did not diminish the level of violence. Along with the Land reform the Government introduced more stringent coercion measures in the form of the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Among the provisions therein was the ability to transfer cases out of disturbed areas and the creation of special magistrates to try cases arising from League activities. This did not amount to martial law but, with the suspension of trial by jury, the country was not far from it. In fact, by the summer of 1881, troop levels in Ireland had risen from just over nineteen thousand to twenty-five thousand.³⁹ Forster warned the Cabinet: 'It is all we can do, by arrests and proclamations and constant employment of force to get on until the act be passed without the collapse of authority and general disorder'.⁴⁰

Despite the fact that thousands of tenants took advantage of the provisions of the Land Act when it became law in the autumn of 1881, violent crime did not subside. The arrest of the League leadership and the proscription of the Land League created such a vacuum of authority in the country at large that the violence spiralled. Without the steadying influence of the League the first four months of 1882 witnessed some of the highest incidence of violence recorded in the conflict to date.⁴¹ The Government treated with the leadership of the League who were released from prison in May, causing Forster to resign in protest. Before Parnell could reassert control of the countryside, Forster's replacement, Lord Frederick Cavendish, and his Under-Secretary, T. H. Burke, were murdered in Phoenix Park.

The killings marked a watershed in terms of the violence. Unified in revulsion at the deaths, dissensions were also bridged in the hierarchy by the elevation of McCabe to the cardinalate. Even relations with Rome were slowly healed. On 11 June 1882 the bishops issued a united pastoral which gave retrospective approval to the League. On religious and political grounds it was 'the indisputable right of Irishmen to live on and by their own fertile soil and to be free to employ the resources of their country for their own profit'. Legal means to redress the injustice of the land system was deemed a 'noble work of justice and charity'. In terms of the violence, the bishops concluded that 'in our belief, they [outrages] would never have occurred had not the people been driven to despair by evictions'.⁴²

Although relations were slowly improving with Rome and the general level of violence was subsiding, the Holy See had a final warning on clerical involvement in political agitation. On 1 January 1883, Leo wrote to the Irish bishops to congratulate them for their success in quelling the disturbances in the country and guiding the will of the faithful. He warned, however, that there were still in Ireland ‘hangers-on of bad company’ engaged in acts of violence. The just cause of the country must be separated from the efforts, advice and works of iniquitous associations. On the issue of clerical involvement, Leo advised that the junior clergy should be restricted from attending political meetings. If any clergy were deemed necessary to be in attendance it should be only those ‘in whose wisdom you especially place trust’.⁴³

The Plan of Campaign

At first glance there seemed little to distinguish the Plan of Campaign from the land agitation that had gone before. There was a similar intent of withholding rents deemed unfair. Violence followed a familiar pattern of confrontation, coercion and eviction. The tools of the National League which had replaced the Land League, such as the boycott, were the same; and so were agrarian crimes such as arson, intimidation and even murder. There were, however, crucial differences. The Plan was, at its heart, a political one directed by the National League and supported by a concerted effort on the part of Nationalist MPs at Westminster. Since the end of the Land War, Parnell had transformed the League into an effective grassroots political machine. Its role was to maintain electoral support for the Irish Party and its demand for Home Rule. Despite the National League’s involvement in violent confrontation, the control exerted by the party leadership was such that the level of violence seldom reached the heights experienced previously.

The response of the Church was also crucially different. In place of the divisions and dissent experienced in the earlier conflict, a broad consensus was forged among most, though not all, of the Irish bishops. The architect of this clerical-nationalist alliance was William Walsh who replaced McCabe as Archbishop of Dublin in 1885. Acting in concert with the Archbishop of Cashel, Thomas William Croke, it was Walsh who shaped the policy of the bishops in terms of the Plan. Building on the approval of the unity reached in 1882, Walsh constructed an alliance in which, in return for the support of the bishops on Home Rule, the League and the Irish Party would take up the struggle for a Catholic university,

under the direction of the hierarchy.⁴⁴ Not quite the establishment of an Irish state, this alliance was nevertheless an almost unparalleled concentration of nationalist power in Ireland.

In the winter of 1885–6, economic disaster once again threatened in the west of Ireland with its attendant result of wholesale evictions. Drafted by William O'Brien and John Dillon, the Plan was published in the League newspaper, *United Ireland*, at the end of 1885. It was envisaged that tenants on each estate should combine and offer their landlord what they deemed a fair rent. If the landlord refused to come to terms, tenants would withhold the rents and submit them to a central fund to fight evictions. The League would step in if these funds proved insufficient. Once again, the point of ignition for potential violence would be the actual act of eviction which would be vigorously resisted. Farmers who took up the land of an evicted tenant would face the boycott. Events in Ireland would be supported by an aggressive campaign in the House of Commons. Despite initial doubts about the Plan and having had little involvement in its inception, Parnell agreed to continue the agitation at Westminster.⁴⁵

As Walsh and Croke positioned the hierarchy behind the League, Logue maintained his neutral stance. It was one thing, however, to support those 'abler hands at the helm', but quite another to permit his own priests to take a leading role in local League activities. In contrast to the Land War, the League was now very active in Raphoe. In the course of 1885, Logue found himself in conflict with one of his priests, Father James McFadden, over his presidency of the National League branch in Gweedore. Even before the Plan commenced, Logue had found cause to censure McFadden over his activities in the parish.⁴⁶ He was undoubtedly a compassionate priest who could not stand idle when faced with the privations of his poorer parishioners. Unfortunately, he was prone to rash and intemperate outbursts and was, at times, consumed with a sense of his own martyrdom.

By the end of 1885, Logue had moved to rebuke his priest privately because of his League activities. In a letter in December McFadden profoundly regretted that the course he had taken in public life had prompted censure. 'I accept', he told Logue, 'your Lordship's remonstrance in all humility and obedience and I place myself unreservedly at your Lordship's disposal'. Prior to writing to McFadden, Logue had summoned him to answer for his actions. At the meeting, the priest had offered to 'break all further connection with the National League'. But McFadden's impression had been that Logue did not want him to act 'in such a way as to give grounds for suspicion that you had interfered, but to drop off gradually'.⁴⁷

This was a remarkable and cunning manipulation. McFadden, it would appear, knew well his bishop's reluctance to court publicity. On 19 December, he wrote thanking Logue for his forbearance and for realising that it was better to have a restraining influence on the local League than to have no control at all. 'I have this very night', he said, 'taken the first steps towards reforming the constitution of the branch in the direction your Lordship likely intends'. This had included passing resolutions against the boycott.⁴⁸

By January 1886, however, McFadden's obsequious obedience had been replaced by reproachful sullenness. He told Logue that it had become common knowledge that it was he who had ordered the local branch to pass resolutions against boycotting. McFadden told how the local landlords and their agents were rejoicing at the news of the decline of the League in Donegal. 'So much did they dread and respect its power', he said, 'that they freely gave expression that the collapse of power here must necessarily bring with it the fall of the League throughout Ireland'. He told Logue that he had made an earnest appeal that no resistance or show of opposition should be given henceforth to the enforcement of the law in any way. He concluded with the hope that Logue would be satisfied that he had made a great effort and would sympathise with him 'in the bitterness of the humiliation that my enemies guess at the cause'.⁴⁹ Logue's interference in the workings of the Plan in Raphoe proved merely a temporary setback for McFadden. In truth, he never really abandoned or limited his League activities and remained politically active until the end of the 1880s.

At the end of 1886, following the defeat of the Home Rule Bill, Gladstone's Liberal Government was replaced by a Unionist administration under Lord Salisbury. The change in leadership heralded a more robust approach to the Plan than had been undertaken by the Liberals. The Government embarked on a concerted campaign aimed at pacifying Ireland. This approach was soon visible in the simultaneous enactment of two bills in the autumn of 1887. Land reforms improved the criteria under which tenants could have their rents reassessed under the terms of the 1881 act while the Criminal Law Amendment Bill was designed to bolster the powers of the Irish judiciary by introducing sweeping powers of arrest.

The new Chief Secretary, Arthur Balfour, was determined that, along with getting a 'licking', Ireland should have some measure of relief.⁵⁰ He also moved to meet head-on the challenge of clerical participation in the Plan by stiffening the resolve of the judiciary when prosecuting priests. Salisbury went as far as sounding out British ambassadors across Europe

as to the efficacy of compelling priests to break the seal of the confessional by testifying in court.⁵¹ In Rome, the cause of the British Government was fought by John Ross, a Catholic convert and Irish Unionist who had close links with leading Catholics in England such as the Duke of Norfolk. Throughout the Plan, Ross kept Balfour well informed of events in the Vatican and lobbied strongly for a permanent representative there to be appointed by the Government.⁵²

The hierarchy condemned the introduction of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, declaring that Ireland was free from grave crime. 'In common with our lay fellow countrymen', they added, 'we view with deep indignation this new attempt to despoil our country of her constitutional rights and liberties and to place her at the mercy of unfriendly and irresponsible Government officials.'⁵³ The resolutions were not quite a declaration that the Government in Ireland was illegal. Nevertheless, the strident language used pointed to one that was, at the very least, oppressive and unjust.

Logue was absent from the meeting in April 1887. He had just been nominated for the position of coadjutor in Armagh and was busy with his transfer from Raphoe. He did, however, contact Walsh before the meeting to advise him that 'your Grace may take me as assenting to anything the committee [of bishops] may decide'.⁵⁴ Logue's apology did have a ring of truth. He translated to the see of Armagh without his successor having been named, a fact that would not be remedied until December.⁵⁵ To a certain extent, therefore, his responsibilities would have been divided between Armagh and Letterkenny. While Logue was not disinterested in the land issue his letter illustrates his faith in the Archbishop of Dublin. Despite his misgivings over the Plan and his absence from the meeting, his prior agreement showed at least a willingness to defer to the direction of Croke and Walsh.

The Archbishop of Cashel, however, was not enthusiastic at the prospect of Logue presiding at the bishops' meeting as Primate of All Ireland. As Primate *of Ireland*, second in ecclesiastical authority, the Archbishop of Dublin, first McCabe and then Walsh, had presided at meetings in the absence of the ailing Daniel McGettigan. Croke expressed surprise at the ease with which McGettigan had been granted a coadjutor. Remarking that the Archbishop of Armagh must have 'worked up the oracle' with the authorities in Rome, he testily concluded by telling Walsh 'we must have you a cardinal' before the meetings fell to Logue.⁵⁶ Croke's prickly response to Logue's advancement was not borne out of personal malice. It was more a case, perhaps, of resenting any possible interference

with the alignment of the bishops which he and Walsh had worked so hard to create.

By the summer of 1887, however, the Pope had decided to intervene directly in Ireland. Leo remained susceptible to the promises of the English lobby and his view of Ireland was rather typical of his general attitude towards nationalism in Europe. In the case of Poland, for example, Leo chose to conciliate Tsar Alexander III rather than appear favourable to Polish claims for independence from Russia. His policy went as far as finding bishops for vacant sees who would not antagonise the Tsar.⁵⁷ Thus, he resolved to send a papal envoy to assess the Irish situation. Despatched under the direction of the Cardinal Secretary of State, Archbishop Ignatio Persico arrived in Ireland at the end of July. Persico's brief, on the surface at least, was straightforward. He was to study conditions in Ireland so that the Holy See would be able to adopt provisions to remove the causes of difficulty. Persico was encouraged to exhort the bishops to have confidence in the British Government and report wherever clergy transgressed the papal letters of 1881 and 1883.⁵⁸

In the course of his mission, Persico criss-crossed the country interviewing prelates, landlords and politicians, and viewing conditions in Ireland first hand. In August 1887, he visited Armagh where he was feted by Logue and Daniel McGettigan. Persico's secretary, Enrico Gualdi, later told William Walsh that the envoy had made quite an impression on the two.⁵⁹ For his part, Persico despised the Archbishop of Dublin from first meeting. He was also suspicious of his own secretary whose relationship with Walsh and closeness to the Irish bishops he found deeply troubling.⁶⁰ By the end of 1887, the atmosphere surrounding the Persico's visit had turned increasingly bitter. On 22 December 1887 Persico complained to Walsh about an article in the *Pall Mall Gazette* which branded him 'a vile intriguer' and 'betrayed of the Irish cause'. Walsh illustrated amply how he felt by underscoring heavily both descriptions on Persico's letter.⁶¹

Persico's final report, submitted at the end of 1887, read as a damning indictment of the Irish Church and the Plan of Campaign. He noted the precarious existence of the Irish peasantry and praised their religious devotion and respect for the Holy See. On the relationship between the Church and the national movement, however, the report was scathing. Persico concluded that the Irish clergy deluded themselves that they dominated the movement while it was Parnell and his associates who really did so. Persico wrote of the Irish Party and the National League as if they were secret societies.⁶² His account of the involvement of the Church in the Plan was perhaps even more damning. In their acquiescence in boycotting, they

had become 'executors of biased and despotic decisions issued by tribunals . . . leading to the unjust punishment of those accused'. Some of the clergy carried their enthusiasm for the Plan and antipathy towards the landlords to the point of illegality.⁶³ Despite painting a picture of complete ecclesiastical disorder, Persico recommended that no declaration should be issued by Rome on the Plan or the conduct of the Irish Church. Despite everything, he still believed that the hierarchy were the key to a settlement.

Persico's visit and report had far reaching consequences for Logue. On 3 December 1887, he inherited the see of Armagh on McGettigan's death. Persico was impressed by Logue's moderate nationalism. He noted in his report that the new primate was not 'obsessed with the need to publish letters or comments on political questions'. He was scrupulously conscientious, favoured strong ecclesiastical discipline and was indifferent to public opinion.⁶⁴ Persico noted that Logue's succession would prove advantageous. With a new primate installed the power of presiding at bishops' meetings would fall to Logue, not Walsh.⁶⁵ By February 1888, however, Persico was voicing his impatience that the new primate had not moved to assert his control over the bishops. He was convinced that Logue had the strength and courage to counter the influence of the Archbishop of Dublin but was hesitating.⁶⁶

While Logue knew nothing of Persico's opinions he was quite aware of the climate of criticism the Irish bishops faced at Rome. His new position also accompanied a remarkable change in his attitude to the Plan. The shift was not centred on the violence or the operation of the Plan but rather the actions of the police and the Irish administration. That the role of archbishop would entail a much greater public prominence was starkly brought home in January 1888. At McGettigan's month's mind mass in Armagh, James McFadden was arrested by police and brought to Armagh gaol. Logue was incensed. He told a gathering crowd that the timing of the arrest could not be regarded as anything other than an insult to the memory of the late primate. He accused the police of conduct calculated to exasperate the people and drive moderates to excess. More importantly, Logue made a point of entering the cell of the priest he had censured in 1886 and warmly shaking him by the hand.⁶⁷

The new primate backed this very public expression of solidarity with McFadden by writing a letter to Tobias Kirby to express his fury at events in Armagh. He could be fairly confident that the Pope would hear of the incident. Kirby was a former classmate and friend of Leo XIII and the two men retained a cordial and close relationship. Logue repeated the accusations he made at the arrest of McFadden. He pointed out that the priest

could have been arrested anywhere along the route from Letterkenny to Armagh and the actions of the police were not only disrespectful but deliberately provocative. He concluded by declaring 'and these are the men trying to secure the alliance of the Holy Father in crushing Irish Catholics!'⁶⁸

By February, his anger had not diminished and he once again contacted Kirby to vent his frustration. His account of a rally to protest against the arrest of McFadden and another priest illustrated the extraordinary reversal of his policy of non-intervention. Logue told Kirby that he had contacted the Chief Secretary's office to broker an arrangement on the rally. He would guarantee the behaviour of the crowds if the police were kept quiet. The protest passed off peacefully and Logue relayed the often quoted anecdote that an army officer declared that the people were more afraid of the umbrellas of the priests than of the rifles of the army and police.⁶⁹ Logue's purpose in writing, however, was not just to demonstrate his own ecclesiastical control. He told Kirby that after the rally the police went around in the dead of night, pulling from their beds all those who had attended the protest. Logue was outraged at the bad faith shown by the police and the unspoken moral was that that the Government could not be trusted.

The problem for the bishops was that such accounts of the British Government's villainy were being ignored in Rome. In December 1887, Walsh had left for the Holy See to celebrate the Pope's jubilee, unaware that a campaign of vilification was already being waged against him. In February, Persico told Cardinal Rampolla to be careful when dealing with the Archbishop of Dublin. Walsh, he said, exercised too much influence over his episcopal colleagues, even to the point of intimidating and silencing them.⁷⁰ Walsh had intended a leisurely trip to Rome but his plans were changed drastically by a terse and unexpected summons from Leo.⁷¹

Despite the ominous signals emanating from the Vatican, Walsh remained upbeat. He told Croke that what amounted to a calling to account for the Church had gone very well. Walsh was confident that his testimony to the Pope had been such that the British lobby in Rome had been 'routed all along the line'.⁷² On 12 February, accompanied by the Bishop of Cork, Thomas O'Callaghan, he outlined his idea of an acceptable settlement to Leo. Walsh explained that the roots of the unrest in Ireland were to be found in the injustices of the land system. He explained the boycott and the operation of the Plan and argued that stopping evictions immediately through the introduction of a bill would go a long way towards restoring order. All in all, the archbishop believed that his mission

had gone well and achieved an understanding at Rome of the situation in Ireland.⁷³

The decree

But Leo had already set in motion a process which would have devastating consequences for the Irish Church. In the time that Walsh was in Rome, the Pope had referred the Plan and boycotting for consideration by the Congregation of the Holy Office. Formerly the Inquisition, the Holy Office dealt with heresies, threats to the faith and matters of doctrine. In a verdict issued in April 1888, Cardinal Monaco, Prefect of the Holy Office, declared boycotting and the Plan of Campaign contrary to the faith and morals of Catholics. Roman authority had reversed completely the verdict of the Irish Church, given in 1886, that the Plan was moral.⁷⁴

Walsh was dumbfounded by the decision. Not only had he no inkling that a pronouncement was imminent but the decision was published in the press before being communicated either to him or to the Irish Church. Clearly at loss, he wrote to Croke seeking advice on the next move. 'It is hard to say what is to be done', he said, 'the whole thing is deplorable. Ought anything to be done?'⁷⁵ For his part, Logue was rather sanguine about the decree. He had never been comfortable with the methods of the National League, despite deeply resenting the reaction of the Government. He told Croke on 30 April that the bishops had no choice but to publish the decree. The problem was how to do this without political mischief. He had no difficulty with the decree itself. He told the Archbishop of Cashel that it was a question of justice 'on which the Pope has every right to pronounce and to be heard'. However, danger lay in the reaction of the Irish Party incurring condemnation from the Holy See. 'Their mistake', Logue told Croke, 'is that they regard this as a question of politics which it is not.'⁷⁶ It was Logue's conviction that, in terms of Church-State relations, political actions were subject to the moral sanction of the Church. Religion and politics could not and should not be separated. He was also annoyed that his position as primate had been ignored. He complained to Croke that 'though there were two of our number in Rome, I have never received a line or a hint to indicate what was going on.'⁷⁷

The attempts by the bishops to mitigate the immediate effects of the decree were undermined, almost from the outset, by the attitude of the Irish Party leadership. Following a meeting in Dublin on 17 May, a party committee dominated by more secular members such as John Redmond and William O'Brien condemned not only the decree but also the role of

the Pope in Ireland.⁷⁸ The situation was worsened still by the development of a very public dispute between the Bishop of Limerick, Thomas Edward O'Dwyer, and the League leadership. On 25 May 1888 O'Dwyer published a letter to the Lord Mayor of Limerick ahead of a League meeting called to discuss the decree. He warned the nationalist leadership that the verdict of the Holy Office was binding in conscience. He also declared it a grievous sin to disobey it. The League responded by holding a public meeting in Limerick at which O'Brien accused O'Dwyer of disloyalty and cowardice. Whilst some in the hierarchy were appalled at such an attack on one of their colleagues, Croke was furious that O'Dwyer had spoken out at all. He told William Walsh that it had been agreed at the last meeting of the bishops that no individual statements were to be issued. The Bishop of Limerick, Croke reported furiously, had broken that agreement in the worst way – 'the little cur'.⁷⁹

What should have happened, or what was expected in Rome, was that clerical involvement in the Plan would stop. It was not expected that the decree would be read in every church. There was, however, an expectation that the decree would be obeyed. The bishops met again on 30 May, declaring that the decree affected the realm of morals alone and the Pope had acted out of filial concern for the people of Ireland. The bishops warned the laity against intemperate and irreverent outbursts directed at the Holy See or the decree and reminded their flocks that the Roman pontiff had 'an inalienable and divine right to speak with authority on all questions appertaining to faith and morals'.⁸⁰ At the regular meeting of the hierarchy held in Maynooth on 27 and 28 June 1888, however, the bishops once again attacked the Government and the land system in Ireland.⁸¹ There was no condemnation of the Plan and clerical participation in most areas remained undiminished.

It is not clear whether the decree had any direct effect on level of agitation which was already in decline before the Pope's intervention.⁸² By the end of the year, there was disappointment in Government circles that the bishops in Ireland had not moved to condemn the Plan outright. In July, John Ross happily reported to Balfour from Rome that the decree would have to be obeyed. However patient Rome may have been, there was no intention of letting the Irish Church ignore it. Failure to comply on the part of the clergy would mean condemnation by the Holy See. Moreover, Cardinal Rampolla had told him that, if the Plan persisted, individual bishops would be called to account for events in their dioceses.⁸³ By March 1889, Ross's initial enthusiasm had turned to disillusionment. He complained to Balfour that the bishops could agree with the terms of the

decree without actually enforcing it. The nationalists, he said, had 'debased the priests by converting them into their instrument'.⁸⁴

The disapproval emanating from Rome made Logue nervous. If Persico had hoped Logue might wrest control of the bishops away from Walsh he was mistaken. Logue was content to follow the lead given by the archbishop and, as relations with Rome deteriorated, increasingly looked to Dublin for guidance. By November 1888, Rampolla was putting increasing pressure on the Irish bishops. Logue was particularly unnerved to receive an angry letter from the Cardinal Secretary in which 'he launches into denunciations of priests and laymen for their disrespectful, if not rebellious reception of the decree of the Holy Office'. He told Walsh that the letter had concluded with the reminder that the bishops were bound, at all hazards, to denounce and condemn the Plan and lay criticism of the Pope.⁸⁵

In his reply, Logue defended the Church and the national movement, insisting that in the few areas where the Plan was in operation in the archdiocese, the priests were there to prevent trouble. Disturbances only existed on two estates and there the landlord had evicted Catholic tenants and replaced them with Protestants. He told Rampolla that much of the bitterness surrounding the decree had been exacerbated by the jeers and taunts of the Orange press.⁸⁶ In December 1888, Walsh informed Kirby that the decree had brought nothing but odium on the Holy See, despite the efforts of the bishops. The people now thought that the Pope was 'one of the strongest supporters of their oppressors' and he claimed that Ireland would experience the same kind of anticlerical nationalism seen in Italy during the pontificate of Pius IX unless something was done.⁸⁷

In spite of Roman disapproval there was still an appetite for clerical involvement as the Plan ground on into 1889. Irish Catholics had been told that the Plan and boycotting were immoral but the Irish hierarchy had refused to condemn or separate itself from the national movement. In this equivocation the Plan was allowed to continue. By the end of the year, however, individual bishops had begun moves to rein in their more politically active priests. In Raphoe, the new bishop, Patrick O'Donnell, attempted to reason with James McFadden in an attempt to get him to moderate his League activities.⁸⁸ By October, however, his patience had snapped over the priest's continued indiscriminate involvement in the Plan and his numerous arrests. McFadden was forbidden to meddle in political or agrarian affairs under pain of suspension. He was not to speak publicly or publish anything on politics without the permission of his bishop for a period of five years.⁸⁹

The final censure of McFadden was symptomatic of a wider disengagement by the hierarchy from the national movement. By 1890, the gulf between the bishops and the national movement had widened further. It was not just the continuing and vocal disapproval emanating from Rome. The British lobby at the Holy See was using the decree to interfere with episcopal appointments. John Ross explained to Balfour that the deportment, speeches and publications of prospective bishops would be examined for anything that contradicted the Papal edict. Such infractions could be passed on to the Prefect of Propaganda or Cardinal Secretary of State in the hope of overturning the result of the *terna*.⁹⁰

Another factor in the rift was the periodic running battle between the Bishop of Limerick and the League leadership. Some bishops, such as the Bishop of Clonfert, Patrick Duggan, were irritated that O'Dwyer could not instruct on the decree without his usual 'flourish of trumpets'.⁹¹ By 1890, however, the hierarchy had begun to close ranks around their colleague. In a letter to Walsh in July 1890 Logue called the dispute a crying scandal. On the one hand, he did not approve of O'Dwyer's public crusade which he believed had manufactured the controversy.⁹² On the other, he deeply resented the attitude of the Irish Party leadership. They had compromised the bishops by not keeping quiet on the issue of the decree and the interference of Rome. Logue further fretted that O'Dwyer would be seen as the only bishop in Ireland willing publicly to defend the Pope and the Holy See. He complained to Walsh that the bishops had remained silent when many things were said and done that were anything but becoming in Catholics, to guard against the appearance of dissension. 'Now these gentlemen', he told Walsh, 'parade our silence as an approbation of every word they have ever said and every step they have ever taken'.⁹³ In August, Logue's fears were confirmed in a letter from Tobias Kirby from which he learned that Leo wished to thank O'Dwyer personally for his defence of the Holy See.⁹⁴

There was a growing awareness among the bishops that the hierarchy had become very much the junior partners in the clerical-nationalist alliance.⁹⁵ Clerical support for the Plan and the League had brought the Irish Church little except disapproval from Rome. The alliance with the Irish Party had delivered little on the issue of Catholic education or even Home Rule. In October the bishops met to consider the worsening situation and issued a strident affirmation of the authority of the Holy See. They emphatically reminded their flocks that 'on all questions appertaining to morals, the Sovereign Pontiff, the Vicar of Christ on earth has an inalienable right and divine right to speak with authority'. The decision of

the Holy Office on boycotting and the Plan was upheld in that they were both deemed morally unlawful.⁹⁶ To repair the rift with Rome, the bishops resolved to send a delegation, headed by Logue. By the end of 1890, however, matters were changed utterly by the O'Shea divorce. As the national movement split, the issues surrounding Parnell's leadership provided a catalyst for rapprochement between Rome and the Irish Church.

The accidental cardinal

The decision to appoint Logue as cardinal was greatly influenced by his conduct during the Land War. Persico had been impressed with Logue's moderate nationalism and his reluctance to court political controversy. He was not, however, disinterested or politically indifferent. Logue pursued his own agenda. He remained strongly averse to political violence and to priests becoming entangled in political agitation. In public, he closely supported the line determined by Croke and Walsh. The Plan of Campaign had the support of the bishops and his objections to it were not so pronounced as to persuade him to crusade against it in the way that O'Dwyer did. Neither was his sense of nationalism advanced enough to allow him to fully endorse the Plan like Walsh or Croke. However, Logue's elevation was also influenced by strong lobbying against the Archbishop of Dublin.

Along with his favourable impressions of Logue, Persico presented a stream of negatives regarding Walsh to the authorities in Rome. In 1888, for example, he described Walsh as being more politically compromised than any other bishop in Ireland.⁹⁷ Other voices in Rome joined the campaign. In February 1890 John Ross told Balfour that Cardinal Rampolla agreed with him that Walsh and Croke were 'both incorrigible' and had spoken quite openly about them as 'the two pillars of much of the evil that prevails in Ireland'.⁹⁸ Having been of little interest to the British lobby at Rome, by the 1890s Logue had suddenly become the centre of attention. As relations between the Holy See and the Irish Church thawed, it became common knowledge that Leo wished to seal the rapprochement by awarding a red hat.

The Archbishop of Dublin, however, did have supporters in the Church, who lobbied strongly on his behalf. The Bishop of Elphin, Laurence Gilooley, was particularly forthright in his praise of Walsh and his criticism of Logue. In September 1890 he wrote to Cardinal Simeoni at Propaganda to inform him of Logue's indecision in calling episcopal meetings. 'The primate is slow and indecisive', he said: 'he is not conscious

of the importance of events or only partially understands them'.⁹⁹ This was as untrue as it was unfair, but Gillooly wanted Propaganda to reserve the authority of convening meetings to the see of Dublin.

At the same time, the Duke of Norfolk warned Rampolla that the elevation of Walsh would be a sign of encouragement 'to those who are striving to confound the cause of religion with disorder and misrule'.¹⁰⁰ Logue, he went on, had 'no doubt spoken in terms to be regretted but I think everyone admits that he is a bishop rather than a politician'.¹⁰¹ Logue's moderation and general reticence were contrasted sharply with Walsh's appetite for political entanglements involving not just himself but the whole of the episcopate in Ireland. The primate was very much portrayed as a safe pair of hands. Norfolk's views might have been unfair to Walsh, but his estimation of Logue was true to a large extent. As we shall see, however, it was not the case that Logue lacked a political vision. It was rather that he had a bishop's view of politics.

But to assign responsibility for Logue's appointment solely to the opinions of others would be to do him a disservice. Following the bishops' October statement in 1890, he was in the happy position of being able to present Leo with a personal testimony of the realignment towards Rome of the Irish Church. Logue explained directly to both Leo and Cardinal Simeoni the difficulties faced by the Irish Church during the Plan and with the publication of the decree. O'Donnell, who accompanied him, told Walsh their audience with Leo had left nothing to be desired. 'His Grace, the primate', he said, 'explained the present situation most satisfactorily'. Logue had done 'great justice' to the cause of the Irish Church.¹⁰² It is doubtful that the Pope would have appointed Logue as cardinal if he had found anything objectionable in him. Admittedly, the disqualification of both Croke and Walsh on political grounds and concerns about the age of John McEvilly in Tuam were critical factors in Logue's elevation. But he also had much to commend him to the position, other than simply the negative comparisons made with the other archbishops.

Whatever the reasons behind his appointment, the decision came as a complete shock to the Irish Church. Patrick Glynn, an Augustinian attached to St Patrick's Church in Rome, told Walsh that amazement was a poor word to describe feelings there. Rumours had been circulating the Vatican since November 1892 that a red hat was on its way to Ireland after an eight-year gap. Glynn had received assurances from Cardinal Vannutelli, Prefect of Ceremonies, that Dublin would receive the honour. Glynn told Walsh that he could hardly credit the news. Cardinal Vannutelli said that the sorrow he felt at the appointment was felt by nine out of ten cardinals

in Rome.¹⁰³ Croke, who professed to being unsurprised, having had prior knowledge, was less than charitable about Rome's decision. 'So be it', he told Walsh, 'provided it is to be an adjunct of the primacy and not an exceptional favour to an individual'.¹⁰⁴ He later told Tobias Kirby that the announcement had taken everyone by surprise. It was generally expected that the distinction would go to Dublin. 'But Rome seems to glory in surprises and perhaps I had better say no more on the subject'.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the most considered and prophetic response to the news came from the Bishop of Raphoe. Writing to console Walsh in January 1893, Patrick O'Donnell said that with some reason he would be considered to have suffered at the hands of the enemies of Ireland's cause. 'Thus, though your influence for good under one aspect would go up through being clothed in scarlet', O'Donnell went on, 'the influence Lord Salisbury dreads and misrepresents so assiduously will rise very considerably by you being left as you are'.¹⁰⁶ To his great credit, Walsh was quick to congratulate Logue on the 'signal honour' conferred on him by the Holy See. He also added that he hoped this would be the means 'of strengthening your Grace's hand in the management of your unruly team'.¹⁰⁷

Logue was under no illusions as to the nature of his appointment. 'Of course', he told Walsh, 'I know the choice was not determined by any personal consideration; for if it were, there could be very little found in me to deserve it'. The news had left him miserable and out of sorts and all he wanted was a quiet Christmas. He recognised that his red hat was due to the circumstances of his being in Armagh. 'I did not leave Raphoe willingly', he confessed, 'and I never regret having done so more than now'.¹⁰⁸ It is, perhaps, an irony of history that one who did not seek high station, was convinced of his unworthiness for the role and lacked the confidence and the inclination to undertake public responsibility, should become the spiritual leader of Catholic Ireland.

Notes

- 1 *Freeman's Journal*, 12 Jan. 1891.
- 2 Cullen, *Economic History*, p. 149.
- 3 Townshend, *Political Violence*, p. 115.
- 4 Lee, *Modernisation*, p. 73.
- 5 Vaughan, *Landlords and Tenants*, pp. 9–11.
- 6 Larkin, *Modern Irish State*, p. 24.
- 7 Toner Biography, Logue Papers, ADA, box 10, folder 4, ch. 5, p. 12.
- 8 Martin to Logue, 25 Feb. 1880, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 107 (1880).
- 9 *Dublin Mansion House Relief Committee Proceedings*, p. 325.

- 10 Martin to Logue, 25 Feb. 1880, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 107 (1880).
- 11 Edwards to Logue, 14 Mar. 1880, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 140 (1880).
- 12 *Derry Journal*, 2 Jan. 1880.
- 13 *Freeman's Journal*, 14 Jan. 1880.
- 14 *Ibid.*, 4 Feb. 1880.
- 15 Egan to Logue, 20 Jan. 1880, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 14 (1880).
- 16 *Dublin Mansion House Relief Committee Proceedings*, p. 327.
- 17 Bew, *Land and the National Question*, p. 116.
- 18 Forster to the Cabinet, 10 May 1880, TNA, CAB 37/2 (23).
- 19 Townshend, *Political Violence*, pp. 128–32. For statistics, see p. 183.
- 20 Macaulay, *Holy See*, p. 94.
- 21 Simeoni to McGettigan, 1 June 1880, McGettigan Papers, ADA, box 1, 'Holy See' (Translation).
- 22 Kirby to McCabe, 16 June 1880, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 331, folder 346/1.
- 23 *Freeman's Journal*, 11 Oct. 1880.
- 24 Kirby to McCabe, 15 Oct. 1880, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 331, folder 346/1.
- 25 Duggan to McCabe, 27 Oct. 1880, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 331, folder 346/1.
- 26 Larkin, *Modern Irish State*, p. 67–8.
- 27 *Freeman's Journal*, 10 Jan. 1880.
- 28 Larkin, *Modern Irish State*, pp. 68–70.
- 29 Moran to McGettigan, 5 Mar. 1881, McGettigan Papers, ADA, box 5, 'Seminaries'.
- 30 McGettigan to McCabe, 6 Mar. 1881, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 332, folder 346/1.
- 31 Logue to McCabe, 9 Mar. 1881, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 332, folder 346/1.
- 32 Logue to McCabe, 12 Mar. 1881, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 332, folder 346/1.
- 33 Larkin, *Modern Irish State*, p. 84.
- 34 Moran to McCabe, 21 Mar. 1881, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 332, folder 346/1.
- 35 Logue to McCabe, 9 Jan. 1881, McCabe Papers, DDA, box 332, folder 346/1.
- 36 McFadden to Logue, 13 Oct. 1881, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 17 (1881).
- 37 Collins to Logue, 1 Nov. 1881, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 27 (1881).
- 38 *ICD*, 1882, p. 242.
- 39 Townshend, *Political Violence*, p. 141.
- 40 Forster's Memorandum to the Cabinet, 30 June 1880, TNA, CAB 37/5 (45).
- 41 Townshend, *Political Violence*, p. 177.
- 42 Larkin, *Modern Irish State*, pp. 172–3.
- 43 Leo XIII to McGettigan, 1 Jan. 1883, McGettigan Papers, ADA, box 1, 'Holy See' (Translation).
- 44 See Larkin, *Modern Irish State*, chs 8 – 10.
- 45 Larkin, *Plan of Campaign*, p. 16.
- 46 Gallagher to Logue, 11 Feb. 1885, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 3 (1885).
- 47 McFadden to Logue, 17 Dec. 1885, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 16 (1885).

- 48 McFadden to Logue, 19 Dec. 1885, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 17 (1885).
- 49 McFadden to Logue, 4 Jan. 1886, Logue Papers, RDA, no. 1 (1886).
- 50 Curtis, *Coercion and Conciliation*, p. 178.
- 51 Salisbury's circular, 12 Apr. 1887, TNA, CAB 37/20 (30).
- 52 Ross to Balfour, 10 Mar. 1887, Balfour Papers, BL, MS 49821, fols 1–6.
- 53 Resolutions, 21 Apr. 1887, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 359, folder 402/6, 403/1–3.
- 54 Logue to Walsh, 12 Apr. 1887, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 359, folder 402/6, 403/1–3.
- 55 Maguire to Walsh, 21 Dec. 1887, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 359, folders 402/6, 403/1–3.
- 56 Croke to Walsh, 21 Jan. 1887, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 359, folders 402/6, 403/1–3.
- 57 Chadwick, *History of the Popes*, p. 432.
- 58 Macaulay, *Holy See*, p. 90.
- 59 Gualdi to Walsh, 3 Aug. 1887, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 359, folders 402/6, 403/1–3.
- 60 O'Callaghan, 'Persico Papers', *Collectanea Hibernica*, xxxiv/xxxv, p. 274.
- 61 Persico to Walsh, 22 Dec. 1887, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 359, folders 402/6, 403/1–3.
- 62 Macaulay, *Holy See*, pp. 118–20.
- 63 *Ibid.*
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- 65 O'Callaghan, 'Persico Papers', *Collectanea Hibernica*, xxxvi/xxxvii, p. 294.
- 66 *Ibid.*, nos. 34/35, 1992–93, p. 185.
- 67 *Freeman's Journal*, 21 Jan. 1888.
- 68 Logue to Kirby, 20 Jan. 1888, Kirby Papers, AICR, no. 31 (1888).
- 69 Logue to Kirby, 15 Feb 1888, Kirby Papers, AICR, no. 74 (1888).
- 70 O'Callaghan, 'Persico Papers', *Collectanea Hibernica*, xxxiv/xxxv, p. 185.
- 71 Morrissey, *William Walsh*, p. 98.
- 72 Walsh to Croke, 23 Jan. 1888, Croke Papers, NLI, P0612.
- 73 Walsh to Croke, 12 Feb. 1888, Croke Papers, NLI, P0612.
- 74 Larkin, *Plan of Campaign*, p. 202.
- 75 Walsh to Croke, 29 Apr. 1888, Croke Papers, NLI, P0612.
- 76 Logue to Croke, 30 Apr. 1888, Croke Papers, NLI, P0612.
- 77 *Ibid.*
- 78 Larkin, *Plan of Campaign*, p. 224.
- 79 Croke to Walsh, 14 June 1888, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 360, folder 406/4–6.
- 80 Walsh to Logue, 26 May 1888, in Walsh, *William Walsh*, pp. 352–4.
- 81 *IER*, 3rd ser., ix (July 1888), p. 672.
- 82 Townshend, *Political Violence*, p. 195.
- 83 Ross to Balfour, 1 July 1888, Balfour Papers, BL, MS 49821, fols 51–2v.
- 84 Ross to Balfour, 19 Mar. 1889, Balfour Papers, BL, MS 49821, fols 23–6.
- 85 Logue to Walsh, 14 Nov. 1888, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 360, folder 403/4–6.

- 86 Macaulay, *Holy See*, p. 235.
- 87 Walsh to Kirby, 14 and 28 Dec. 1888, Kirby Papers, AICR, nos. 434 and 454 (1888).
- 88 O'Donnell to McFadden, 15 Mar. 1889, Kirby Papers, AICR, no. 47 (1889).
- 89 O'Donnell to McFadden, undated, O'Donnell Papers, RDA, no. 67 (1889).
- 90 Ross to Balfour, 26 Sept. 1889, Balfour Papers, BL, MS 49821, fols 28–31.
- 91 Duggan to Walsh, 21 June 1889, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 361, folder 404/1–3.
- 92 Logue to Walsh, 17 July 1890, Walsh Papers, DDA box 362, folders 404/4–6, 405/1–2.
- 93 Logue to Walsh, 31 July 1890, Walsh Papers, DDA box 362, folders 404/4–6, 405/1–2.
- 94 Logue to Walsh. 16 Aug. 1890, Walsh Papers, DDA box 362, folders 404/4–6, 405/1–2.
- 95 Larkin, *Fall of Parnell*, p. 158.
- 96 *IER*, 3rd ser., xi (Nov. 1890), p. 1048.
- 97 O'Callaghan, 'Persico Papers', *Collectanea Hibernica*, xxxviii, p. 171.
- 98 Ross to Balfour, 6 Feb. 1890, Balfour Papers, BL, MS 49821, fols 43–4v.
- 99 Larkin, *Fall of Parnell*, p. 193.
- 100 Macaulay, *Holy See*, p. 344.
- 101 *Ibid.*, p. 354.
- 102 O'Donnell to Walsh, 6 Dec. 1890, Walsh Papers, DDA box 362, folders 404/4–6, 405/1–2.
- 103 Glynn to Walsh, 19 Dec. 1892, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 401 Aug-Dec.
- 104 Croke to Walsh, 19 Dec. 1892, Walsh Papers, DDA, box 401 Aug-Dec.
- 105 Croke to Kirby, 28 Dec. 1892, Kirby Papers, AICR, no. 618 (1892).
- 106 Macaulay, *Holy See*, p. 357.
- 107 Walsh to Logue, 18 Dec. 1892, Logue Papers, ADA, box 3, 'Dublin archdiocese'.
- 108 Logue to Walsh, 19 Dec. 1892, Walsh Papers, DDA, Aug-Dec, box 401.