

# Engaging Critics

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- Noël Carroll

First, I would like to thank Carl Plantinga for organizing this session, thereby assuring that my book has had at least three readers. He has already done more for me than my publisher. Second, let me thank my engaging commentators for their challenging remarks which have forced me to clarify my positions in ways that will undoubtedly make me a better person.

I

I will begin my response by focusing on Murray Smith's comments, since he has concentrated on the first chapter in *Engaging the Moving Image*: namely, 'Forget the Medium!'

Smith is worried that I am what he calls a 'medium eliminativist'. He further argues that one cannot reasonably be a medium eliminativist, since artworks must be delivered to their audiences via *some* medium. Obviously, Smith does not believe in telepathy, which is unfortunate, because were there telepathy we could have cognitive film production along with cognitive film studies.

Anyway, with respect to film, or, as I prefer to say, 'the moving image', I am not a medium eliminativist, if that means that I think that there is no physical stuff or no instruments from which moving images are made. If a medium eliminativist denies that film media exist, then I don't see how I could be one, since, as Smith correctly observes, one of my arguments against the notion that there is a medium of film in the singular is that I maintain that what we call film (or the moving image) comprises multiple media, including celluloid-based film *and* videotape, wide angle lenses *and* telephoto lenses, and so forth. I do not reject the assertion that film art reaches its audience through material means. I

only deny that there is one medium here – the one and only medium of film – and that it mandates anything about what should or should not be made by a filmmaker either in terms of style or content.

Since Smith acknowledges that I advance the multiple-media argument, it is unclear why he would suspect me of medium eliminativism as well as of denying that moving images reach their audiences via media. Smith appears to reach these conclusions by taking note that I deny that every artform requires a medium in the standard sense of that term – i.e., that it is a necessary condition of an artform that it have a *physical* medium in which it is embodied. Smith concludes from my denial that every artform requires a medium that I am committed to the view that the artform of the moving image lacks media. But not only does this conflict with what I've explicitly claimed, the allegation would also appear to rest upon a logical fallacy. From 'Not every art form requires media' it does not follow that 'No artform requires media.' For example, it does not follow from 'Literature does not possess media' that 'Film does not possess media.' I'm certainly not guilty of this dubious inference. I'm not sure who is.

Smith rejects my claim that literature lacks a physical medium in any interesting sense. I rejected *words* as a plausible candidate because I take it that literary authors are not generally concerned with words as graphic entities but with *meanings* which are not physical media. Smith acknowledges that this is probably what I have in mind in an endnote but argues that words as physical entities – namely, as sounds – are pertinent to the artform of literature. But a concern with sound, though very germane to certain literary genres, such as lyric poetry, is not of equal relevance to every literary form. One does not try to perform the music of the words in most large novels either aloud or in one's

mind's ear nor, in most cases, is one intended to do so. That most poems and some novels have a musical dimension does not show that a sonic aspect is an *essential* feature of everything we are wont to classify as literature.

*But* don't we have to access literature through some medium? Of course. Yet we need to draw a distinction between cases where it is claimed that the physical media associated with an artform have an artistically significant impact on the nature of what is created in that artform, versus the case where the media in question are merely delivery systems. The graphic text in most large novels is just a delivery system. Literature as such has no physical media – neither pens nor ink – that influence the *creative* output of every author.

Not only does literature in general lack a physical medium in any interesting, non-delivery-system sense; even if words were such a medium, they would not constitute a distinctive literary medium, since words are shared by many artforms. Smith gives us an intriguing case in point – Michael Snow's *So Is This* (1982), a film of sentences. If words are a physical medium in the relevant sense, then doesn't this film show us that words are one of the media of film as well as of literature?

On the other hand, Smith seems to believe that Snow's film vindicates the friends of medium-specificity talk, since we classify it as a film rather than as a poem. Smith asks how we can do this, unless we notice that the words are mounted on celluloid. But I think that Smith is wrong here. We categorize *So Is This* as a film because we know the tradition in which Snow is working. It fits into an ongoing conversation about the nature of cinema. If Milton's *Paradise Lost* were recorded on film – a page being turned every thousand frames or so – and, if that was the only form in which it existed, we would not call it a film, but a poem. The same would be true if Ezra Pound initially 'published' his *Cantos* on film. Our classifications depend far more on history and what we know of the author's intentions than upon that through which medium the work is delivered.

When I have urged folks to forget about the medium, I have done so in a context where what

people were being told to ignore were the *theoretical* claims about medium-specificity – that is, the assertion that cinema has a unique medium and that the nature of that medium dictates, in terms of style and/or content, what should or shouldn't be made on film, or, alternatively, predicts what will succeed or fail on film. It is that proposition that my slogan encourages people to forget; that is the ambition that I say film theorists should abandon.

Smith points out that there are many reasons not to forget about the medium entirely. Artists should not forget about their media. It is important that they know about lenses in order to attain the effects they intend. On page 241 of *Engaging the Moving Image*, I observe that an image maker ought to be aware of the screen format in which she is working, if only so that she can be sure that her audience will see what she wants them to see. Thus, I agree that *artists* should know the media that compose their artform so that they can identify serviceable tools for realizing their purposes. But this hardly amounts to an endorsement of the theory of medium-specificity. A carpenter is well advised to know his hammers, but his hammers do not entail what sort of structures he should build.

Likewise, I agree that knowledge of what a medium can do might inspire image makers. It is said that the Chicago school of TV realized that the capacity for immediate transmission made the informality of early talk shows like the *Today* show with Dave Garraway a live option. That may be true, but it scarcely supports theoretical claims like 'All broadcast TV should exploit the physical capacity of the medium to deliver spontaneous transmissions of events,' nor the hypothesis that only programs that take advantage of TV's potential for spontaneous transmission will succeed.

My point is simply that theorists should give up their obsession with medium-specificity theses. That is what we should forget, what we *theorists* should get over. And that recommendation is eminently compatible with the perfectly unexceptionable truism that artists should be familiar with their tools and their materials and the different, often non-

converging, opportunities that they afford.

Moreover, in advocating that as theorists we give up the idea of medium-specificity, I am not implying that as critics we forget that so many have been convinced of versions of this view that some filmmakers have taken up their cameras explicitly to rebel against it. Arguably that is part of what Snow is up to in *So Is This*. However, noting the role that *beliefs* about medium-specificity (whether pro or con) play in the generation of a work does not grant any credibility to the notion of medium-specificity as a theoretical generalization. Understanding the work of certain artists may involve appreciating their relationship to theosophy, but adverting to theosophy as a critic or interpreter in such a case, while doubtlessly legitimate, is, at the same time, completely independent of the truth or falsity of theosophy. So even if critics may sometimes have to refer to the concept of medium-specificity in order to make sense of certain films, that has nothing to do with substantiating the theory.

I should also confess that throughout Smith's discussion I am not always sure that I understand his points, since he often speaks of the film medium in the singular. But apart from the various media, in the plural, that comprise the artform of the moving image, I don't know what that medium is. He can't, at this late date, be referring to film stock. So what does he have in mind? It is hard to evaluate claims on behalf of the medium when one does not know what it is. The terms of the argument become far too abstract.

Smith has gallantly risen to his wife's defense, challenging anyone who would besmirch her use of the idea of 'the cinematic'. I commend his chivalry and, in any event, I never meant to be rude to his wife. Like Smith, I usually understand what people mean when they use the term 'cinematic'. They are usually applying it, often unbeknownst to themselves, in virtue of a previous medium-specificity *theory* that regarded what Smith calls some historically validated practice (or what I would call a period-specific style) as determined by the nature of the medium. The user may not be aware of the lawlike claims that motivate calling some films

cinematic and others not. But without that historical background of theory, one would not be able to make sense out of the way in which certain films fall into the *cinematic* group and others do not. Furthermore, because that background of theory is conflicted, what can count as cinematic is often stylistically extremely divergent. The photographic realist will count a Lumière *actualité* as very cinematic while a montagist will not. So in order to understand what someone is telling you when they say something is cinematic, you need to figure out what defunct theory is governing their usage of the term. And to do that, you have to look at the film they are describing and calculate under what theory it would qualify as cinematic. But in that case, the term 'cinematic' is not informing you about the film, but rather about the person using that term.

Smith has presented me with an array of interesting challenges. Now I have one for him. If he thinks that film theorists should not forget about the medium, then it is up to him to articulate some pressing *theoretical* questions that can only be addressed by discussing the generic nature of the film medium. The burden belongs to him to show why the theorist cannot forget about the medium. For if there are no general questions to which reference to the film medium, as classically construed, is relevant, why shouldn't film theorists forget about it?

## II

Jinhee Choi has reservations about my account of filmic communication. I claim that a naturalistic account of filmic communication – one based upon taking notice of our inherited perceptual dispositions – goes further toward explaining the emergence of film (or the movies) as a major form of mass art than do competing models such as the linguistic and/or semiotic ones. Choi does not appear to think that I am mistaken with respect to *these* rival approaches. But she does not think that I have canvassed all the pertinent competing theoretical approaches. She emphasizes that I have not considered socio-economic explanations.

I suppose that what I find most perplexing about this objection is why I would need to countenance socio-economic factors as rival factors rather than complementary factors to the ones I wish to highlight. In the essay 'Art and Human Nature', which Choi cites, I allege that taking account of various hard-wired perceptual and emotive dispositions of the human organism will make a significant contribution to what we should say about the emergence of the moving image as a mass artform. But I do not claim that this kind of research will tell the whole story.

Obviously, no matter how suited to reception by the human frame an artwork is, if it isn't distributed by some socio-economic network, it will not be consumed by mass audiences. No mass distribution, no mass consumption. That is axiomatic. That is true, no matter which model of communication you opt for.

On the other hand, you do need something to distribute. The product, if communicative, must be informationally accessible. The naturalistic approach assumes that there is an available account of distribution as a complement, as do alternative theories of filmic communication – just as theories of distribution will assume the availability of some account of what makes the product being distributed effectively communicative. There is a natural division of labor with respect to different research projects here. Thus, I do not understand why socio-economic accounts of film distribution are being posed as rivals to a naturalistic account of filmic communication.

Perhaps another way to put it is this: success as a mass artwork will depend on intrinsic factors and extrinsic factors. Primary intrinsic features of the mass artwork are those that contribute to its user-friendliness; extrinsic factors will include a distribution system that will spread the work far and wide. The naturalistic hypotheses I advance concerning filmic communication explain *in part* some of the ways in which films are intrinsically user-friendly. How then intrinsically user-friendly products get to their users calls for a different order of explanation – extrinsic explanations involving institutional, industrial, and economic factors. These are not competing research

programs, but complementary ones. Nor do I see why I need to embark upon this research project myself. That's one of the advantages of being a piecemeal theorist.

Choi cites an economic factor in favor of explaining the increasing appearance of the close-up in recent film – the filmmaker's awareness that her film is going to show up on TV. This is certainly part of the explanation. However, it does not preclude a naturalistic supplement: to wit, the close-up is favored in TV because of the biologically endowed attention-riveting and informationally rich potential of the human face.

So I would like to challenge the methodological basis of Choi's objection to naturalism. The naturalist need not be in competition with socio-economic accounts. Rather, he should aspire to combining the best socio-economic hypotheses on offer with his own theorizing.

Another challenge that Choi proposes for the naturalist involves the so-called Art Cinema. But I think that I need not rise to the bait. I have been pretty clear that the domain of my naturalistic hypotheses is, first and foremost, the moving image as mass art, the movies, if you will. It is primarily with regard to the movies that I have argued that the sort of cognitive/psychological conjectures I have developed may make some (and I underline *some*) explanatory contribution. But I am not convinced that I can nor that I am obliged to proffer an account of – as Choi puts it – the survival of the Art Cinema. Again, that is one of the perks of piecemeal theory; you don't have to explain everything nor even make believe that it is within your power to do so.

Of course, the Art Cinema shares certain features (like pictorial representation) with the movies which are also keyed to our enduring perceptual dispositions. However, the Art Cinema has other features that preclude its function as an artform for mass untutored audiences, and it is these features that are constitutive of what counts as an instance of Art Cinema. The Art Cinema is designed for tutored audiences – audiences informed of certain traditions, interpretive strategies, and so forth. To account

for the way in which such an enterprise can be sustained will call for different approaches than the one I recommend for mass market-movies. I imagine that these approaches will involve a great deal of cultural and historical speculation. I would not anticipate that the Art Cinema could be theorized naturalistically to the same extent that movies can be.<sup>1</sup> But neither do I see why it is incumbent upon me to do so.

Lastly, some quibbles: Choi suggests that I think that movies serve some adaptive purposes. I do not. Though I think that art as such is adaptive, what I claim specifically about movies with regard to our evolved human nature is that they tap into and take advantage of certain biologically ingrained mechanisms – such as attentiveness to movement, facial recognition, and so on – that are adaptive.

Also, Choi says that the movement to fiction filmmaking is to be explained economically on the grounds that fiction films are easier to plan and to shoot than actualities. I am no historian, but I can't believe that Méliès' *A Trip to the Moon* (1914) was easier to make than a Lumière documentary of workers leaving the factory or passengers disembarking from a train. Am I missing something here?

### III

Cynthia Freeland has concentrated on my remarks about evaluating films. The essay in which these occur was merely an introduction to the problems of film evaluation. It attempts to solve some of these problems, but puts others to one side, acknowledging that my approach to this area of inquiry is still an unfinished project. Consequently many of Freeland's questions are fair, since I have not yet supplied answers to them. Perhaps I can use this occasion in order to get a bit further on this topic. But I don't expect to finish the job herein. Far from it.

First, let me get one thing out of the way – I have nothing against interpretation. I enjoy interpretation. As a critic I have spent more brain cells than you can count eking out interpretations of the sublime and the ridiculous. My only point in the book is that academics

devote most of their energy to interpreting things and are very guarded about evaluation, whereas most people are very keen on evaluation and less concerned with the non-obvious meanings of films.

I propose that, to a certain extent, film evaluation can be given a rational, objective foundation by appreciating that evaluative judgments are generally based on categorization. Following Kendall Walton, I claim that this a psychological fact about humans. One evaluates something by placing it in a certain category with associated standards of excellence, and then adjudges it to be good or bad of its kind. This doesn't get us a rational, objective evaluation, however, since one may slot a particular object in an opposite category for irrational or subjective reasons. To move from the fact that we categorize to the claim that we may evaluate objectively, we need the idea that some categories are *correct* and others not *and* that we have ways of telling which is which. So in the book I try to spell out those ways while also conceding that this is not the whole story of film evaluation. At best it would supply an account of objective evaluation in terms of whether things are good or bad of their kind or kinds. But when we evaluate a film, we may want to know more than whether it is good of its kind; we may want to know how it compares with other types of things. As Freeland correctly points out, I have only gestured in the direction of answering that question.

But before trying to say more about that issue, let me address some of Freeland's reservations about what I have said as opposed to what I have left unsaid.

Freeland wonders whether I am right in presuming that all evaluation is rooted in categorization. In a footnote I acknowledge that there may be exceptions to this claim. If Kant is right, evaluations that something is *beautiful* in his sense of free beauty are not based on categorizations but are response-dependent judgments. Maybe, Freeland speculates, empirical psychology will confirm Kant's hypothesis and discover even more examples of category-independent evaluations. I wouldn't

want to foreclose this possibility on a *priori* grounds. However, that would not show that a great many of our evaluations are not category relative, and that human artifacts – such as films – are especially susceptible to category- relative evaluation, since they are made to serve some point or purpose. Therefore, any account of film evaluation will have to include a part about category-relative evaluation. And I've started to supply that part. Remember, I haven't claimed to have proposed a complete theory of film evaluation.

Moreover, if there is a class of response-dependent evaluations whose objectivity needs defense, when and if psychologists identify it, we may have to locate correctness in the responses of those who have been habituated perceptually by exposure to the objects reckoned to possess the relevant values in the past to the point where their sensitivities are so attuned and cultivated that we regard them as reliable natural detectors of the relevant values. That is, with the properties in question, if there are such response-dependent value properties, we may have to go the Aristotelian-Humean route that Freeland suggests.

Though Freeland appears to agree that a great deal of film evaluation is category relative, and even supplies a number of examples from recent reviews to bolster the view, she points out that not all the categories that critics invoke are *film* categories. First, let me make a brief comment about the examples. They show that opting for a category is a natural first move in film evaluation; they do not show that these are the correct categories for the films in question. That may be subject to further debate. Second, though my examples in the book are all of categories that belong to the history of film (rather than being medium specific), I am not committed to holding that only categories located in film history are the *correct* ones. For example, a filmmaker may attempt to realize a culturally pre-existing category which no other filmmaker has previously essayed – a Socratic Dialogue, for example. I see no reason why in such a case it would be inappropriate to classify the film under the category of Socratic Dialogue and then to evaluate it – at least in part – in terms of the

relevant criteria of excellence which are generally connected to the purposes of the kind in question. Moreover, most of the film categories that I do mention in the book – such as melodrama – are hardly *film* specific. So I should not be construed as requiring that the relevant critical categories be limited to those available in the history of film.

I should acknowledge that Freeland is not convinced that film kinds and genres have purposes, though I think to deny this in most cases belies the undue influence of aestheticisms. Most genres in the generative sense – like mystery – as opposed to genres that are mere critical constructions have purposes. A classical detective fiction is intended to incite curiosity about whodunit. I do not think that can be denied.

Freeland and I also disagree over how difficult it can be to place films in categories. I think that it is much easier than she does. I think that Matthew Barney's *Cremaster* series – which I too greatly admire – is a very original contribution to a well-entrenched category to which Kenneth Anger's *Inauguration of the Pleasure Dome* (1954) and Harry Smith's *Heaven and Earth Magic* (1962) also belong and which P. Adams Sitney labeled 'mythopoetic cinema' thirty years ago.

As for Michael Moore, he has made known the category to which he believes *Fahrenheit/911* (2004) belongs. It is supposed to be documentary *and* partisan propaganda; the film is intended, Moore says, to defeat Bush. Furthermore, films that straddle or mix these categories are well-precedented. Many films made in the sixties and seventies of the left persuasion belonged to this category – call it 'agit-prop-doc'. And many of them expressed a rage against, and hatred of, the powers that be that is comparable to Moore's. What is novel about *Fahrenheit/911* is not its category – which is well known – but its venue. What is new about it is that something so vituperative has achieved such wide distribution and uptake. What once was restricted to the province of various counter-cultural enclaves has gone mainstream with *Fahrenheit/911*. That, rather than its genre, is what is unprecedented. What the phenomenon

suggests is that those of us who saw those agit-prop-docs in the sixties at SDS meetings now want to see them in our local cineplexes.

One might be tempted to think that *Fahrenheit/911* represents a new genre because it appears to combine oxymoronic elements – documentary and propaganda ones. But this is not bizarre rhetorically; one claims documentary status in order to be convincing. Of course, if one's propagandistic aims undermine the veracity of one's assertions, that is likely to garner demerits on the documentary side of the ledger – nonfiction films are beholden to the truth. So such films are likely to call for mixed verdicts – pluses to the extent to which they win over the hearts and minds of their target audiences and minuses inasmuch as in order to do so they abandon faithfulness to accuracy, coherence and logic. And that is where I think *Fahrenheit/911* stands – it is very good at rallying the anti-Bush partisans and much less impressive as a coherent argument.

Freeland accurately observes that I have not claimed to have shown that every question about film evaluation can be managed by the procedures that I outline. We may wish to know more about a film than whether it is good of its kind or good of its various kinds (if it inhabits more than one category). We may wish to compare its value to films of different categories. Freeland wants to know whether that can be done and, if it can be, can that sort of evaluation be carried off objectively?

These are very complicated issues. My hunch is that *if* we are prepared to evaluate certain films outside the categories they inhabit or to compare them outside the categories they share (for example, two films might be compared in virtue of being narratives), then it is likely to be in virtue of some estimate of their importance to the larger culture in which the evaluation is being proffered. That is, if we think that it is not nonsensical to compare certain categorically divergent films, then we need some common measure of their worth that is substantial enough to make a difference in terms of their value as works of art. The contribution of the film in question or the type or genre of the film

to the culture seems to be about the only plausible measure in this neighborhood. And it also appears, in fact, to be the first consideration we muster when we try to justify comparative judgments of this sort..

If we think – as I believe we do – that, all things considered, Jean Renoir's *Grand Illusion* (1937) is better than Tim Burton's *Beetlejuice* (1988), since both are exquisite examples of their respective kinds and excellent in the categories they share, it is, *ex hypothesi*, most probable that we think that the contribution to our moral and intellectual culture that the Renoir film makes is greater than that of the Burton film. Speaking crudely and only heuristically, we might try to represent this by saying that on a scale of minus-ten to plus-ten, both films get a nine-point-nine in terms of category excellence. But on a similarly calibrated scale for cultural importance, let us say that *Grand Illusion* receives a nine-point-nine again whereas *Beetlejuice* only receives a six. Overall, then, *Grand Illusion* would merit nineteen-point-eight points whereas *Beetlejuice* would only garner fifteen-point-nine points where the point spread, I propose, is most plausibly attributable to the different cultural weight that we assign to the respective films.

Though we may be uncomfortable in admitting it, where we feel confident in claiming of one of two films of barely commensurable categories that the latter is superior to the former, I conjecture that that is probably because we are convinced that the latter (or the category to which the latter belongs) is superior to the former (and/or its category). That is what grounds our assessment. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what other grounds there might be that are serious enough to warrant the relevant judgment. The only reason we feel nervous about confessing this, moreover, is that many of us are still in the grips of the ideology of the autonomy of art which dictates that considerations of social importance should be beyond the pale. And yet as members of society, we cannot but help to harken to its claims when it comes to assessing almost everything, including art.

Undoubtedly these hasty suggestions open a hornet's nest of problems. Here are some hard questions and some tentative answers:

(1) Does it make sense to compare every film in this way? Probably not. But where we *want* to make the comparison, this seems the only way to go. That is, where the comparison does not seem silly, this appears to be the only reasonable option for assessing comparatively films of extremely divergent categories.

(2) Will this approach always yield a determinate answer? No. It will not where we are not satisfied that we can attribute determinate variable weights to the cultural contributions of the respective films. Nevertheless, agreeing that conclusive results may often be elusive is consistent with saying that such results can be secured *sometimes*. Moreover, I think that we will be increasingly reassured in issuing judgments of cultural importance as films undergo the test of time. Furthermore, such judgments will be easier to reach where there is a wide value gap between the films in question – as there is between *Citizen Kane* (1941) and *Flash Gordon Conquers the Universe* (1940). But where the value gap is small, say between two masterpieces, things become progressively inconclusive and perhaps even silly.

(3) How likely is it that agreement can be reached in disputes over the value of films by appealing to cultural importance, since disputants are apt to weight differently the criteria they use to estimate cultural importance? Obviously, many disputes may remain unresolved. However, there is no reason to think that some will not be settled. We should not expect to resolve every dispute in film evaluation. We have not done that in any other field of inquiry.

(4) If people weight the criteria differently that they use to assign cultural importance, won't there always be some lingering relativity/subjectivity at this level of film evaluation? Won't it be more difficult to establish objectivity at this level of film evaluation than at the level of judgments in virtue of categories? Yes. But again there are no *a priori* grounds to suppose that in some cases, through discussion and reflection, the appropriate weight of the pertinent criteria cannot be ascertained

(especially over time), and the verdict be rendered objective.

Freeland points out that in order to assess cultural importance, questions of morality will most often need to come into play. For some reason, she thinks that I might object to this. But I have always defended a role for moral judgment in artistic evaluation. Perhaps Freeland fears that questions of morality will make the process subjective. In contrast, I think that to the degree to which morality has an objective basis, morality will, to the extent it figures in film evaluation, lend its objectivity to film criticism. Likewise, where moral assessments reach the limits of objectivity, so too will film evaluations that are motivated by them.

In sum, there may be – I think that it is likely that there are – some film evaluations that can be made outside the context of categories. Those evaluations, I conjecture, will depend upon adding into our all-things-considered assessment of the films in question both their value (or disvalue) as instances of the kind or kinds they inhabit *plus* the value (or disvalue) of their cultural contribution – which may include multiple factors involving the ways in which they influence the modes of feeling and thinking of the relevant culture. I speculate that in some cases we will be able to arrive at these evaluations determinately, rationally, and objectively. In other cases, it may be (i) silly to ask for more than a categorical evaluation, (ii) there may be no determinate evaluation reachable, and (iii) it may not be possible to weight the criteria necessary for fixing cultural importance in a way that avoids relativizing the overall judgments to the interests of different parties. All these obstacles must be acknowledged. But that does not preclude the possibility that in some cases – through deliberation and conversation – we cannot reach rational and objective conclusions. How will we know which cases? By *continuing* engagement with and discussion of the canon of film history.

Smith concluded by asking whether I thought that there was a special role for film studies. This may be it.

**Note**

- 1 Choi's remarks about Baldwinism in this regard are quite provocative, but I wonder whether she can pursue this particular line of inquiry without colliding head-on with the socio-economic case that she earlier propounded against my naturalism.