

The Barbary Corsairs, King Charles I and the Civil War

Historians recognize many constitutional and ecclesiastical conflicts that led to the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642. But there was another factor that lay thousands of miles away in the Islamic Mediterranean: the Barbary captives, those English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh seamen, captains, and travellers who were captured and enslaved in Morocco and in the Ottoman regencies of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli (Libya).¹ When Charles I succeeded to the throne in 1625, there were hundreds of these captives among the Barbary corsairs; by 1640, there were thousands.

A crisis developed around these captives which historians have not examined in the context of the build-up to the Civil War. K. R. Andrews has argued that the captives and their 'clamorous' relatives had a 'small influence' on the course of events leading up to the Civil War, while other historians have completely ignored them.² But as this paper will show, unransomed captives of the Barbary Corsairs played an important role in compounding the conflict between King Charles and the London merchants of the Levant and East India Companies. These merchants lost not only their employees to the corsairs, but scores of their ships too, and subsequently blamed the King for not spending the monies raised through customs, tonnage and poundage, forced loans and Ship Money on maritime security. Similarly, seamen's wives and their families blamed the unransoming of their kin on the King and his ministers. Thousands of these disaffected women and relatives, who gravitated to London from all over the realm, and assembled angrily at the docks or in the precincts of Whitehall, found eager supporters among various members of the Commons who had been spearheading the opposition to the King during his 'eleven year tyranny'.

The Barbary captives became a cause célèbre that exacerbated the social and political unrest in London. By not acting decisively to resolve this foreign policy matter, and by ignoring the numerous petitions that had been presented to him by kinsmen and employers of the captives, the King allowed the Parliamentary opposition to take the initiative in helping, or appearing

to help, the captives, and in adding one more cause of contention that precipitated the Civil War.

By the time Charles I succeeded to the throne, the attacks of the Barbary corsairs on English and Scottish ships, as well as on the mainland, were causing deep anxiety among ship owners, sailors and coastal inhabitants. In May 1625, the Privy Council learned from St Ives that thirty ships from Salee were near the coast: the inhabitants were afraid that the corsairs would land 'by night among us', and especially that there were no ships from the King's fleet to 'fear them'.³ In August, the Mayor of Poole urged the Privy Council to 'take it into your consideration the [protection of] Newfoundland fleet, being about two hundred and fiftye saile of shippe ... haueng some foure or fiue thousand men belonging to the westerne parte'.⁴ The Mayor was afraid that 'within this two yeares They [the corsairs] will not leaue his most excellent Majesty saylors to man his ffleet'. Again in that month, the Grand Jury of Devon wrote to Sir Richard Hutton 'praying him to make known to the King or the Council' the danger of corsair depredation.⁵ The Barbary Corsairs threatened British ships in the mouths of the English Channel, the Bristol Channel and the waterways between Ireland and England: by spreading themselves from Poole around Land's End to the island of Lundy, they endangered all shipping to and from the major western ports of England and Wales.⁶ In this respect, the corsairs were a serious cause of commercial and maritime destabilization.

It was unfortunate for Charles I that his accession to the throne coincided with the Spring season of the year when the weather in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic allowed the corsairs to range far and wide. Furthermore, and for the past few decades, English and other European traders had sailed small ships which made their capture by the North Africans easy: the Christians of the early seventeenth century, wrote the Tunisian historian Ibn Abi Dinar, were not prepared to send out large ships, as a result of which the privateers, who sailed in frigates, were able to capture thousands of them.⁷ Despite these factors, Charles was eager to confront the crisis of the seas, and within weeks of assuming power he sent a letter to the Moroccan ruler, Mulay Zaidan, on behalf of the 'many poore Christians made captives in your contry, both Englishe and Frenche'. In his first foray into Mediterranean foreign policy, Charles reminded his addressee of the close relation that had been established between 'Mully Hamet [Zaidan's father, Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur] and the late Queene Elizabeth, of famus memory; which the Kinge our father, for his part, hath bin very desirous to continewe', and he concluded by confirming the appointment of John Harrison as his representative.⁸ Armed with that letter, Harrison in turn addressed a 'generall letter to the Moores' in which he expressed his hope 'that Englishmen may no more be made captives as enemies, contrarie to those ancient priuiledges in tymes past, but be released and set free'.⁹ The letter seemed to have had the desired

effect: on 30 July 1625, Harrison sent a letter to the Commander of the English fleet in the Mediterranean in which he mentioned that a proclamation had been made by the *mokaddam* of Tetouan that ‘noe Englishman hereafter should bee bought or sould, as hearetofore, by the Turkes, or made captives, but freelie trade’.¹⁰ Charles hoped to contain the danger of piracy from Morocco, or at least that part of Morocco under Zaidan’s authority.

But there were two factors that prevented the King from successfully realizing his goal. First was the rampant corruption and favouritism surrounding the ransoming, or more often the non-ransoming, of captives. In April 1625, the Privy Council had looked into the possible ‘misappropriation of [ransom] money’ by one Edward Eastman; in November, Nicholas Leat was accused of mismanagement and it fell upon the Privy Council in the person of the Archbishop of Canterbury to examine the bills and accounts.¹¹ In 1628, Nicholas Spicer, an Exeter merchant, petitioned the Privy Council: he had ‘sent home 60 captives’, but had not been repaid although enough money had been ‘collected in that county both for his travaile and paines and monyes disbursed’.¹² The King did not have a reliable administration for the ransoming of captives.

Secondly, although the King could negotiate with Mulay Zaidan, there still remained the danger of the Atlantic seaports of Morocco not under the Moroccan ruler (specifically Salee), along with the Ottoman regencies of Tunisia and Algeria. By May 1626 there were said to be 3,000 Britons captive in Algiers and 1,500 in Salee, and although these numbers may have been exaggerated, they reflected the anxiety generated by the corsairs.¹³ Such anxiety coincided with the attempt in that month to impeach the Duke of Buckingham for failing to guard the seas which had become ‘ignominiously infested by pirates’.¹⁴ Although there were numerous reasons for the public dislike of the Duke, the danger by the pirates to merchants and sailors was an effective rallying cry for his opponents. The Duke was well aware of public anger when, a month later, he stated:

And for the pirates of Sallie, and those parts, he [the Duke] saith, it is but very lately that they found the way unto our coasts, where, by surprize, they might easily do hurt; but there hath been that provision taken by his maj. not without the care of the duke, both by force and treaty, to repress them for the time to come.¹⁵

Such ingenuousness, coming from the Lord Admiral of the fleet, angered the Commons and produced a vitriolic attack on the Duke by the Lord High Admiral Sir Robert Mansell.¹⁶ In a *post facto* effort to support the Duke, the King in 1626 sent Francis Vernon to the King of ‘Barbarie’ to ‘deale for the releassing of those his said subjects’.¹⁷ Without a naval ‘force’ that could confront the pirates (especially after the Duke’s unsuccessful expeditions against Cadiz and Rhee), and with a treasury that could not afford the large sums needed for ransom (especially after the coinage shortage and the depression in the early 1620s),¹⁸ Charles had very limited options on how to resolve

the danger to traders and sailors alike. Actually, his only option was to try and bribe the pirate states into some ‘treaty’, as the Duke had mentioned: the envoy took with him a number of Moroccan captives who were being held in England, along with ‘four brass and two iron cannons, with ammunitions, & c.’.¹⁹

Despite the King’s bribery and diplomacy, pirate attacks continued; so much so that by April 1628, the number of captives in Algiers alone was claimed to be 15,000 – an impossible number, but one showing continued public anxiety at the extent of piracy and insecurity on the high seas.²⁰ Edward Kellet and Henry Byam preached two sermons on the return of a captive to England and to Christianity – marking thereby the religious danger which sailors and the country at large faced in the Mediterranean.²¹ In the recapitulation of Parliament’s grievances to the King after the Petition of Rights (June 1628), Sir John Eliot alerted the King to the danger of pirates. Witness, he called on him,

the Turks – witness the Dunkirkers – witness all. What losses we have sustained, how we are impaired in munition, in ships, in men! It is beyond contradiction, that we were never so much weakened, nor ever had less hope how to be restored.²²

Events in the next few years vindicated Eliot’s fear that the English would not be ‘restored’. Actually soon after the King’s dissolution of Parliament in 1629, Eliot wrote in his *Negotium Posterorum* about the ‘twelve hundred christians, the loss of whom caused great lamentation wth their frinds’; soon after, in June 1631, the Algerians attacked Baltimore in Ireland and seized 120 men, women and children.²³ Pressed to act, the King extended Ship Money from the sea towns to all the realm on the grounds that, as he stated in 1634,

Certain thieves, pirates, and robbers of the sea, as well Turks, enemies of the Christian name, as others, being gathered together, wickedly taking by force and spoiling the ships, and goods, and merchandises ... delivering the men in the same into miserable captivity.(24)

The extension of Ship Money failed, however, to protect Britons from the pirates.²⁵ It also seemed to have motivated seamen to leave England and seek employment elsewhere in the Mediterranean – so much so that the King was forced to issue a proclamation on 5 May 1634 ‘commanding all Our Subjects being Sea-men and Ship-wrights ... to returne home within a certaine time’. Despite improvements in the navy, culminating in the 1635 construction of the ‘Sovereign’ of 96 guns,²⁶ dangers at sea persisted: in September 1635 the mayor of Dartmouth wrote to the Privy Council about the numerous seamen who had been taken into ‘miserable captiuitie to increase the number of our westerne captiues there’.²⁷ ‘Unless the Lords use speedy means for protection’ of trade, the mayor of Plymouth had written to the Council six days earlier, on 20 September, ‘many thousands in those parts will be utterly

undone'.²⁸ Similar complaints continued in the next years,²⁹ and in July 1636 the Privy Council received a letter from Plymouth stating that 'we haue already suffered more this sumer then wee did these many yeares last past', and that the Salee corsairs were so devastating that 'two hundred Christians [were] brought into Sally in April the last in [just] one day'.³⁰ The continued failure to protect maritime trade, not only in the Mediterranean, but also in the Atlantic, resulted in the 'beginnings of a principled opposition' since people now recognized that the King was not imposing an extraordinary levy but a regular tax – which failed to achieve its stated goal.²⁸

No voice captured the discontent and near-hostility to the King and his failed policy better than the preacher Charles FitzGeffry in his sermon of October 1636 in Plymouth. In his address to 'The Christian Reader', he turned to the King:

God (I hope) will raise up some happie hand to exhibite to our gratious Soveraignes eyes & ears Danmoniorum gemitus, as our predecessors the old Britons pressed by the Picts, presented unto the Consul Boetius, Britanniorum gemitus (but with better sucesse).

Neither will the illustrious Peere, the Oracle of Iustice in our land, faile to performe what he is said to have promised at Plymouth with tearefull eyes (the evidences of a tender and truely religious heart) to the mournfull wives and children of these oppressed captives, that when he returned to the Court, he would become their advocate unto the Majestie of the King.³²

The preacher's disappointment became less reserved and angry as he recalled the waste and indifference of the court to the plight of the captives:

How much hathe beene lavishly expended in Pompes, in Playes, in Sibariticall-feasts, in Cameleon sutes, and Proteus-fashions, besides other vanities, and yet there is no complaining of want? How many soules might have beene ransomed from that Hell on Earth, Barbarie, with halfe these expences?³³

Whether it was under the pressure of such and perhaps other (unpublished) sermons (FitzGeffry's description of the capture of the English and Cornish residents from Baltimore was particularly moving, p. 46), or because he received a request from the Moroccan ruler, Mulay Al-Sheikh, for naval assistance against rebels in Salee,³⁴ the King realized that he could not ignore the captives any further and he began preparations for an attack on the Atlantic harbour. Salee was an ideal target: its pirates had repeatedly attacked English ships and were holding hundreds of British captives; furthermore, the Moroccan city was divided between two factions, one that supported the weak Mulay Al-Sheikh, and another that opposed him. In 1637 Charles sent his fleet to fight with the North Saleans against the South Saleans. As a result of this intervention, the English-North Salean alliance won and all the captives were released. The commander of the expedition, Captain Rainsborough, reported after the victory that '... we did not only redeem these

[captives], but kept a great many from being taken this summer in not suffering them [pirates] to go out with any good shipping'.³⁵

Soon after, a Moroccan ambassador from Mulay Al-Sheikh arrived in England. The visit of Alkaid Jaurar Ben Abdalla was particularly significant in that the ambassador brought with him '302, English, Scottish, and Irish' captives who had been released through the subvention of the Moroccan ruler – showing thereby 'his exceeding Love to our King, and Country-men'.³⁶ The author of the pamphlet describing the arrival of the Ambassador praised the Moroccan potentate for his 'Princely Bounty', but then urged the redeemed captives to praise King Charles too:

We and they are all bound to love, honour, and obey Our most Gracious King, whose piety and pity was so great, as to take the Affliction of his poore Subjects so farre into his most Princely consideration, as to send his Ships under such wise and able Commanders for their Redemption.³⁷

Both the return of the captives and the reception of the ambassador served as a much-needed publicity victory for King Charles who could not but have felt that he had vindicated Ship Money.³⁸ In August, the Venetian Ambassador informed his Doge and Senate that people in England 'rejoice greatly on the score of reputation' and that the King and his Council 'hope that the people will support the burden of the contributions more patiently than they have done hitherto, when they see that there is some advantage in being compelled to support the fleet'.³⁹

Unfortunately, the impact of the Salee victory was short-lived: for while the Saleans stopped attacking British ships, other corsairs did not, and captives continued to be taken by Algerians, Tunisians and Libyans. Although the captives were a continent away, they were already precipitating a serious domestic crisis: in the absence of their breadwinners, the wives and families of the captives sank into poverty, and after exhausting parish charities, moved to London and presented petitions on behalf of themselves and of their captive kinsmen.⁴⁰ These women and their families numbered in the thousands, as some petitions showed, and became clamorous in their despair and 'disaffection' after they met with little support from the King and his Privy Council.⁴¹

On 13 April 1640, and under rising domestic pressures, the King convened Parliament. A week later, Sir Henry Vane delivered to Parliament a message from the King which included a reaffirmation of the reasons for 'shipping-writs':

That those of Algiers are grown to that insolency, that they are provided of a fleet of 60 sail of ships, and have taken divers English ships, particularly one, called the Rebecca of London (well known to the merchants upon the Exchange) taken upon the coasts of Spain, worth at least 260,000 L and therefore, the writs having gone out upon those weighty reasons, before it was possible the parliament could give any Supply to provide for those things, his maj. cannot this year forbear it; but he doth expect your concurrence in the levying of it for the future.⁴²

Among the many reasons for ship money, there was still, in the King's mind, the danger of the Barbary Corsairs. The King was eager to show both merchants and sailors who were losing ships, lives and freedom, that he was willing to protect their interests – if the Commons cooperated. But the Commons refused to 'concur' unless the King addressed their grievances about religion, property, and parliamentary liberty. On 5 May the King dissolved Parliament and explained to his subjects how Parliament had not supported him in his desire to raise the money he needed to put an end to 'the insolencies committed by those of Algiers, with the store of ships they had in readiness'.⁴³ The King sought to put the blame for the non-ransoming of the captives and the insecurity of the seas on his opponents – and actually sent some of them to the Tower, including the Earl of Warwick, who was a fierce opponent of Ship Money and the idol of the seamen. Apprentices and sailors immediately took to the streets, enflamed by the recent 'failure of the fleet to protect the Channel' from the Barbary Corsairs who had landed in Penzance and seized men, women and children.⁴⁴ Undeterred, and in need of money, the King issued a proclamation on 20 August 'for the levying and payment of the Ship-Moneys in Arreare': despite claiming that he was in need of money because he had 'been forced to provide for the defence of the coast', the move could not have endeared him to a parliamentary opposition that was wary about his attempt to control the navy.

Three months later, and still in need of money, Charles convened another Parliament, and within a month, on 10 December 1640, the Commons had formed a 'Committee for Argiers' to receive petitions on behalf of prisoners and captives in Algiers and Tunis 'or elsewhere, under the Turks Dominions'.⁴⁵ The establishment of the Committee was clearly intended by the Commons to demonstrate to sailors, families and the City investors their concern for the captives and for the safety of maritime trade. After all, and for years, many sailors had gone without pay, many captains had been forced to sell masts and yards to feed their crew, and thousands of captives had rotted in bagnios as their wives fruitlessly petitioned for help. The Committee consisted of men who had either had some experience in the Mediterranean, such as Sir Thomas Roe and Captain Rainsborough, or of Parliamentary leaders who were leading the opposition to the King, such as Pym, or of representatives of the sea towns and ports that were exposed to piracy. A few months after the Committee had been convened, on 1 March 1641, news reached MPs that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 captives in Algiers and Tunis, that the pirates were about to launch massive attacks, and that the policy of ransoming captives was counter-productive. The anxiety generated by this information prodded the Commons to their first reading of the Act that would come to be known as 'An Act for the reliefe of the Captives taken by Turkish Moorish and other Pirates and to prevent the taking of others in time to come'. Two months later, in May, it was resolved that 'a Fleet of Twenty Ships and Pinnaces be sent to Algiers, to assail the Town, and their

Ships, if the Captives be not delivered, upon the Demand of them'.⁴⁶ Although no action ensued, Parliament was eager to show that it was planning to practise what the Committee had promised – and that Parliament would act to subdue the Algerians as the King had subdued the Saleans.

On 30 October 1641, the Act was read *la vice*.⁴⁷ It was read again on 2 November and committed to the 'Committee for Argiers'. Three days later, and in order to raise the money necessary for the implementation of the terms of the Act, a bill was drawn 'for appropriating 70,000 L. or 80,000 L. of the Customs, per annum, to be employed against the Algerine pirates'.⁴⁸ On 10 November, the 'Committee for the Bill touching the Pyrates of Argiers' was summoned to meet on the following morning to go over the wording of the Act and to examine proposed amendments. Two and a half weeks later, discussion of the amendments took place, and by 1 December, the 'additions and amendments ... were assented unto and upon the question voted bee ingrossed'.⁴⁹ On that same day, Parliament presented to the King 'The Grand Remonstrance' in which they listed their 204 grievances. Significantly, in one of the first grievances, they reminded him of the Ship Money he had taken for the purpose of subduing the 'Turkish pirates' – which he had failed to do:

20... a new unheard-of tax of ship-money was devised, and upon the same pretence, by both which there was charged upon the subject near L 700,000 some years, and yet the merchants have been left so naked to the violence of the Turkish pirates, that many great ships of value and thousands of His Majesty's subjects have been taken by them, and do still remain in miserable captivity.⁵⁰

Just a few weeks later, on 3 December, the final discussion of the Act took place: as Simonds D'Ewes reported, 'Divers spake for and against it',⁵¹ but at the end of the debate, the Act was passed.

The Act is too long to quote, but the first part reads as follows:

Whereas many thousands of your Majesties good and loving subjects with their Ships and Goods have of late time beene surprised and taken at Sea (as they were in their lawfull trading) by Turkish Moorish and other Pirats and some of them to free themselves of the cruell and barbarous usage of those Pirats have renounced the Christian Religion and turned Turks and others yet kept in bondage are used with so extreme cruelty as they are in great danger thereby to lose their lives unlesse they shall alsoe forsake the Christian Religion And diverse of those your subjects kept in bondage (being expert and skilfull Mariners) are usually employed at Sea against others your good subjects and prove [very] prejudiciall to them and hurtfull to the trade and merchandise of your Majesties Dominions And whereas aswell your Majesties Subjects as Strangers exporting or importing their goods and merchandize into this Kingdome have ever sithence your Majesties accesse unto this Crowne beene charged with the payment of great sums of money under the name of Custom and that without consent of Parliament which had they beene legally taken ought to have been chiefly employed to the safeguard of the Seas and preservation of your good subjects in their trade of merchandize from the spoile of Pirats and other Sea Robbers but have been exhausted by evil Ministers and not

applied to their proper uses so that your Highnes good subjects have bene exposed to the mercilesse cruelty of those Pirats and barbarous infidels And the Commons taking into further consideration your Majesties pressing wants and great occasions of moneys in these times of distemper aswell in the Kingdome of Ireland as other Kingdoms of forreign Princes so that there will be required some further aid to inable your Highnes to effect so great a Worke besides the present Tunnage and Poundage now granted to our Majestie have therefore for this present pressing occasion and for a time hereafter limited taken into their Resolutions a further way of raising a supply of moneys for the providing and setting forth to the Seas a Navie aswell for the enlargement and deliverance of those poore Captives in Argier and other places if Almightye God shall [so] please to give that blessing unto their enterprises as alsoe for the preventing of the like future dangers unto your good people their persons ships and Merchandizes Do therefore pray your Most Excellent Majestie that it may be enacted And be it enacted by authority of this present Parliament.⁵²

The Act addressed for the first time in English law some of the concerns that had been echoed for decades and that had received little official attention – one of which was conversion to Islam. Numerous petitions had often warned that Britons in captivity were either converting to Islam or were under great temptation or duress to do so; sermons preached about returning ‘renegadoes’ had also alerted the congregations to the high number of converts.⁵³ It must have soon become clear to petitioners and parishioners alike that many of their kinsmen, because they had not been ransomed, had converted to Islam and had settled among the Muslims. The Act is the first official document in England to refer openly to the ‘thousands’ of Britons who had converted to Islam – especially seamen and sailors who were known to be serving among the Muslims. The danger to trade, the Act was saying, partly consisted in not ransoming the captives: had they been ransomed, they would not have joined the Turks against their countrymen.

But perhaps more significantly, the Act established for the very first time in England a national mechanism for raising money to ransom captives and to fight the corsairs. Throughout the years of crisis over the captives, the chief problem had centered on the financial responsibility for ransoming them: who should pay for their release, the monarchy, the company investors, or the families? King Charles believed that his duty was to strengthen the fleet and confront or bribe the pirates – to concern himself with the large military and political picture – and not, necessarily, to spend his limited financial resources on individual captives. After all, the sailors and seamen were employees of the trading companies and were not really in his service, since the English commercial enterprise of the Levant Company and the East India Company was completely in private not government hands.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the trading companies repeated that the responsibility for security and ransom lay with the King who collected tonnage and poundage and other taxes levied expressly for that purpose. By initiating and pushing the Act through

Parliament, therefore, they succeeded in placing the responsibility for the captives on shoulders other than their own: the Act ensured that captive Britons would no longer have to seek help from the Privy Council, their impoverished relatives and communities, or the unwilling trading companies, but would receive help from a willing Parliament that had turned the ransoming of captives from parochial charity to national policy. Although the captives had been seized while pursuing a private enterprise, their ransom was to depend on state finance.

The Parliamentary supporters of the Act recognized that the presence of thousands of Britons in North Africa as captives was not a matter that could be relegated to foreign policy, as the King believed. Actually, they were aware that the captives were causing a domestic crisis on which they could capitalize in their opposition to him. That is why the Act indicted the failed policy of the King and his 'junta' (as Von Ranke called them⁵⁵), and firmly established a confrontational policy towards the pirates: the indifference or limitedness of Charles's policy was to be replaced by what the Speaker of the Commons described as 'the destroying of the Turkish and Moorish Pyrates'.⁵⁶ The Act showed that Parliament, and not the King, had pushed for the establishment of a government mechanism to ransom the captives and confront the pirates – a mechanism that neither Charles nor his father had ever bothered to institute.

On 15 January 1642 the King gave his royal assent for the passing of what came to be known as the Bill of Algiers.⁵⁷ It must have been a difficult Act for the King to sign, given the harsh language in it against his 'evil Ministers'. But the King was unable to confront the Commons any longer: only two weeks before, on 3 January, he had unsuccessfully attempted to have five Parliamentary leaders arrested; and on 6 January, London citizens had taken to arms and had closed the gates of the City. Nine days after the King's assent, on 24 January, Parliament revived 'the former committee for Algiers', and appointed eighteen members to assist 'the lords concerning Algiers captives'.⁵⁸ Among those who joined the Algiers Committee were the following MPs: William Cage (Ipswich); Sir Henry Heyman (Hythe); John Blackiston (Newcastle-on-Tyne); Thomas Barrington (Colchester); Dennis Bond (Dorchester); John Lisle (Winchester); John More (Liverpool); William Spurstow (Shrewsbury); Richard King (Weymouth and Melcombe Regis); Alexander Carew (Cornwall); Walter Long (Ludgershall); Giles Green (Corfe Castle, Dorset); Roger Matthew (Dartmouth); John Percival (King's Lynn); and John Waddon (Plymouth). The Committee also included Robert Greville, Lord Brooke; Robert Rich, the Earl of Warwick; the Bishops of London, Winchester and Rochester; Philip Herbert, Earl of Pembroke; Lord Henry Spencer; Edward Montague, Lord Kimbolton; and Algernon Percy, the Lord Admiral.

It is not difficult to see why many of the above became members of the Committee: they represented cities and harbour towns that were exposed to North African piracy and that had suffered in trade and in the capture and

enslavement of their residents. But what is also significant about some members is their ideological position: they were in the war-party wing of Parliament. When, in September 1640, an opposition petition had been presented to the King by the 'great Parliamentary magnates', it had had the support of Lord Brooke and the Earl of Warwick;⁵⁹ when, in January 1643, a Committee was formed to cement the collaboration between the London radical movement and Parliament's war-party, some on the 'Committee for Argiers' joined it: Cage, Heyman, Blackiston, and Barrington, a 'militant MP', as Brenner described him.⁶⁰ Others on the Committee were known for anti-royalist sentiments: Bond was a 'war-party militant';⁶¹ Lisle would become a 'radical political Independent';⁶² More became a regicide; Spurstow had been hostile to the King ever since he refused to pay the Forced Loan of 1626;⁶³ both Lord Brooke and the Earl of Warwick had been arrested soon after the convening of the Short Parliament for opposing the King's demand of a loan from the city of London, and within a few months, in August, the King declared them both guilty of high treason.⁶⁴ The Committee included a strong anti-royalist faction from Parliament.

Although opposition to the Act in the Commons had been outvoted, there was still resistance to it from some trading sectors. A few weeks after the royal assent, on 21 February, a petition from the Merchant Adventurers trading in French wine was presented to Parliament stating that instead of the one percent that was to be collected, the amount had been increased to six per cent.⁶⁵ A new committee was therefore appointed – which included some of the Algiers Committee along with 'all the Burgesses of the Port Towns' – to 'consider the Grievances pretended to be occasioned by the Bill for the Relief of the Captives of Algiers; and to receive Petitions concerning these Grievances'.⁶⁶ Another petition was presented a few days later, on 24 February, by the Merchant Adventurers trading in cloth: they 'were so oppressed by this new bill for the relief of the captives of Algiers that if they were not some way eased, they must of necessity give over trading'.⁶⁷ These and other merchants were so unhappy with this new financial burden that one Henry Robinson presented a treatise 'to the serious Consideration of the Honourable Court of Parliament' in which he urged that England wage war against Turkey in order to end the danger to trade and the continuing enslavement of Britons. Speaking on behalf of the merchants, he argued that paying ransom would 'encourage and enable those Pyrates to take them slaves againe', and that anyway, the English Levant trade in cloth was not sufficiently competitive with the Venetian and the French. He recommended that the English fleet, with some 40 ships, lay siege to Constantinople, whereupon the city would be starved into submission; he also recommended that the English merchants withdraw their investments in Turkey, which were just above '300 thousand pounds'.⁶⁸ For Robinson, the Levant trade would not become lucrative unless the pirates and the Grand Turk were intimidated into friendship. In the absence of such a forced friendship, the

best alternative was to discontinue trade, cut off commercial and financial relations, and declare war.

But Parliament could not declare such a war because it was preparing for military confrontation with the King. Still, it could not ignore the captives' kin who daily clamoured for assistance both for themselves and for their enslaved relatives. In June, the Commons ordered 'That the monies collected from the members for coming late to Prayers be distributed among the poor women that daily attend the house, whose husbands are captives in Algiers'.⁶⁹ Deeply aware of the impact which these women and their families had on the course of events, especially since captives had not yet been released, Parliament hastened to placate them. Meanwhile, the King wrote to the Turkish Sultan, Murad, complaining about the 'dangerous troubles' he was facing in 'London and many other principall parts of Our Kingdome', and assuring him of the eagerness of his subjects to maintain the 'entercourse of Trade'.⁷⁰ Unable to secure the seas for his merchants, the King thought that by cooperating with the Ottoman sultan, as earlier he had cooperated with the Moroccan ruler, the Muslim potentate would in turn curb the pirates and protect British sea merchants. Robinson's call for war with the Turks was not an option that either Parliament or the King could pursue.

In August 1642 Parliament renewed the Act for three more years, since both piracy against British ships and enslavement of Britons continued to rise. Indeed, in September 1642, it was reported from La Rochelle that the Turks had taken 'some sixty ships, and daily carry off English and Scots like cattle'.⁷¹ In November, a worse piece of information was published: two Algerian 'Turks men of Warre' were taken near the coast, while another two were discovered to be smuggling arms (and 'Irish Friars') to the Royalist party in Ireland.⁷² Action on the part of Parliament was crucial – and became more so after the wives of captives petitioned Parliament on behalf of their husbands in 'Algier'. Although women had petitioned for decades, the April 1643 petition was not co-addressed to the King nor to his Privy Council, as had been the case before. Parliament was now being viewed as the sole saviour of the captives.

It must have been an embarrassing petition for Parliament to receive. For the Bill of Algiers had promised to protect traders and to ransom captives: but the war in Ireland had drawn away Parliament's resources which might have been used for an attack on the Algerians. Faced with the petition of the women, Parliament had no choice but to revert to the same old method for ransoming captives – raising money by public collections:

... the Petitioners humbly implore the Aid of Parliament; as by the said Petition may appear: And whereas the Parliament did heretofore take course for the setting forth of a Fleet of Ships, for the suppressing of those Pirates, and Deliverance of those poor Captives.. It is therefore thought fit, and so Ordered, by the Lords and Commons in Parliament, that Collections be made in the several Churches within the Cities of London and Westminster, and the Borough of Southwark, and

Suburbs, and Liberties of the said Cities, of the charitable Benevolences of well-disposed Christians, for and towards the Relief of the said Captives: And the Monies then collected to be returned and paid, by the Churchwardens and Collectors, into the Hands of the Commissioners of the Navy, appointed by both Houses of Parliament; who are to take care of the Distribution and Employment thereof, for and towards the Redemption of the said Captives.⁷³

At least, Parliament was promising that no longer would evil ministers be handling the money: new (and honest) Navy commissioners would handle the money. Furthermore, the failure of Parliament, the 'State', was due not to indifference but to 'Pressures' which did not permit them to offer 'any other Relief'. On 25 April, four days after the petition had been received, the 'Ordinance for Collections to be made for relief of Captives in Algiers' was issued.⁷⁴

The growing military expenditure of Parliament constituted a difficult 'Pressure', as did the limited success of collecting the One per Centum.⁷⁵ The reason why collecting of the One per Centum was unsuccessful was because of the continued opposition of non-Levant merchants and the cheating on the books. As a result, in October 1644, the Commons reduced the one per cent to a quarter of a per cent.⁷⁶ Although this tax (over and above the tonnage and poundage) was generating hostility among merchants and traders, there was no alternative for raising ransom money except through this means. Two months later, Parliament passed an Ordinance to continue the 'Collection of the Duty of One Fourth per Cent',⁷⁷ and emphasized that the money collected should 'be issued, imployed, disposed and payed... for and towards the Redemption of the said distressed Captives'⁷⁸ – perhaps suggesting that money had been diverted for other purposes. The ordinance was renewed on 5 July 1645 when Parliament reiterated that this customs duty was the only means available for paying for captives which would not be possible 'without continuance of the said duty'.⁷⁹ The apologetic tone that informs the ordinance was a result of the numerous grievances and complaints which had been made by merchants, especially those who found that various traders were cheating the government out of the duty by fraudulent registration of ships. Four days later, another ordinance was passed in which authority was given to a Parliamentary committee to oversee the payment of the overdue sums.⁸⁰ Although the intentions of Parliament were only to ransom captives (there was no mention now of fighting the 'Turks'), there were still merchants, the non-Levant non-City merchants, who refused to cooperate – 'sundry persons ill disposed to that work, and disaffected to the Parliament', the Ordinance stated.

Apprehensive of the cacophony of criticism, and aware of the need to produce results with the money raised through the 'Argiers tax', Parliament had appointed in August 1645 Edmond Cason as its negotiating agent in Algiers. With the military victory of Naseby securely behind it, Parliament sought to show that the money it had been collecting for years in customs would serve the intended purpose of ransoming Barbary captives. After all, in that

month, 'Seven Barbary ships' carried off 'goods and prisoners, including about 200 women' from Cornwall.⁸¹ Parliament needed a publicity victory and quickly dispatched Cason to North Africa to ransom captives. In the account that was later published, *Relation of the whole proceedings concerning the Redemption of the CAPTIVES in ARGIER and TUNIS* (1647), Cason explained that at the end of 1645, he had sailed to Algiers with a large sum of money intended for the captives but his ship had sunk and the money had been lost. Parliament sent him again in 1646 whereupon he was able to effect the release of 242 captives: that more Britons had not been ransomed, he added, was because they had 'turned Turks' and had subsequently been carried 'to Alexandria, and other parts to the Eastwards'.⁸² Cason concluded with the names of all the captives who had been ransomed, their place of origin, and the exact sum of money (recorded 'both in Dobles and peeces of eight') paid for each. This meticulousness may not have been just a personal trait in Cason but a necessary assurance: there is a defensive tone in his *Relation* which suggests that questions had been raised about money and that Parliament needed to show precisely how much money had been spent on ransoming British captives. Cason further showed that Parliament and not the King was being viewed by foreign powers as the ruler of England: that is why he included a copy of the letter from the Basha which was openly addressed not to the King of England, but to 'the High Court of PARLIAMENT of ENGLAND'.⁸³ Indeed, Cason observed how Parliament had always been concerned about the captives: although the captives were in 'a forein State, so remote as Africa' and although there was 'the storme' of war at home,⁸⁴ Parliament had not forgotten its responsibility.

Further proof of how Parliament, and not the King, was now being seen as the deliverer of the captives appeared in a letter written by two captives from Algiers, Thomas Sweet and Richard Robinson. The two men had not been able to raise money for their ransom because of the high price placed on them by their captors. As a result, on 29 September 1646, they wrote to their friends in England for assistance. Most significant in their moving appeal was the following statement:

There is now a part[y] in England renowned over the Christian world for their Piety this way [in redeeming captives].⁸⁵

Even in Algiers, the two men had heard about the 'part[y]' in Parliament which was working toward the release of captives. Two months later, on 26 November, the captives wrote again:

Sithence our last sent you in September, Master Cason the Parliaments Agent, and the Basha have concluded a Peace, and it is agreed, that all English Captives (not turn'd Renegadoes) shall be redeemed.⁸⁶

Parliament was so pleased with the praise in the letters that it authorized their publication in April 1647, not long after it had authorized the publication of

Cason's *Relation*. Where the King had failed, now Parliament could show, both nationally and internationally, that it was succeeding. At the bottom of the publication, a short paragraph was added revealing the concern toward the captives by Richard Prise, Baronet, along with seven others, 'Members of the Honorable House of Commons' who had learned about the two men as a result of the 'Testimony and recommendation of divers godly Ministers of the Assembly' of Divines in Parliament.⁸⁷ Not a single Englishman was to be forgotten by a Parliament that prided itself on the successful ransoming of the captives.

The crisis of the captives occurred at a time when the Barbary Corsairs were strong and navally daring: it was in the Caroline period, and at no time before, that the highest number of Britons were captured – and were left unredeemed by their monarch who never suspected that a crisis could develop around them. Charles failed to realize that no similar number of Britons held captive overseas, whether civilian or military, had ever been recorded; and that those Britons were not soldiers who might get killed in foreign lands and be forgotten but were sailors and seamen who were much needed by the City merchants and ship owners, and who were constantly communicating and pleading with their kinsmen from Hull to Devon, Edinburgh, London and Portsmouth. While he may have chosen sometimes to ignore them, their relatives, employers and Parliamentary advocates did not.

Like his father, Charles sent his fleet only once into the Mediterranean, although he achieved better results than did the 1621 Algiers expeditioners. Charles focused his attention on circumventing attacks on traders by trying to establish diplomatic ties (often with the help of bribes) with the North African rulers. But the political situation in the regencies as well as in Morocco was unstable: Charles would sign a peace treaty with a specific ruler only to find that the latter's successor or rival did not honour it. By counting on diplomacy, Charles may have hoped to avoid spending the large amounts of money necessary to ransom his subjects. But the North African rulers depended on the ransoms of the European captives to support their ailing national economies: the corsairs were privateers who shared their booty with the rulers. No amount of treaty-signing would put an end to the corsair attacks – nor bring back the unransomed captives.

Finally, Charles failed to realize that any foreign crisis could not but cause an internal crisis too.⁸⁸ By this failure, he opened the door for the opposition in Parliament to seize the initiative towards the captives and mobilise popular support against royal inefficiency and indifference. The Bill of Algiers presented the first official admission by the monarchy about the thousands of captives in North Africa and about the cruelty of their plight and conversion to Islam; it also blamed the King's corrupt administration for failing to act effectively on behalf of the captives and their starving and parish-burdening families. More importantly, however, the Bill changed the ransom process

which Britons had been used to for decades: instead of depending exclusively on the arbitrary decision of the King and his Privy Council, ransom money became a matter of national responsibility administered by a Parliamentary committee. Parliament succeeded in demonstrating to thousands of seamen, their kinsmen, and their City employers that Parliament, and not the King, provided the financial mechanism whereby funds could be raised to ransom the captives and bring them home.

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Notes

- 1 For studies on Barbary captives from Britain and the rest of Europe, see Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Barbary Corsairs* (Westport, Connecticut, Negro Universities Press, first published 1890); Charles Penz, *Les Captifs français du Maroc au XVIIe siècle (1577–1699)* (Rabat, Imprimerie Officielle, 1944); Roger Coindreau, *Les Corsairs de Salé*, (Paris, 1948); Stephen Clissold, *The Barbary Slaves* (New York, Barnes and Noble, 1992, first publ. 1977); John B. Wolf, *The Barbary Coast: Algeria under the Turks, 1500 to 1800* (New York and London, W. W. Norton and Co., 1979); Ellen G. Friedman, *Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Period* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); Bartolomé and Lucile Benassar, *Les chrétiens d'Allah, l'histoire extraordinaire des rênégats, XVIe–XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 1989); and my introduction to the edition of *English Captivity Narratives in North Africa, 1577–1704* (Columbia University Press, forthcoming).
- 2 K. R. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 168. In *Merchants and Revolution* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), Robert Brenner closely studied the tension and subsequent clash between King Charles I and the City merchant establishment of the Levant and East India companies; but he paid very little attention to the crisis of the captives. Kevin Sharpe in *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1992) also paid little attention to these captives and their political impact. The only historian who has studied the captives and England's Mediterranean involvements is David Delison Hebb in his *Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642* (Aldershot, Scolar Press, 1994). Hebb, however, did not try to link the captives to the London City merchants and the Civil War. Both K. R. Andrews and A. Thrush used the findings of Hebb to analyze the background of Ship Money and the 1637 Salee expedition, but neither linked the crisis of the captives to the advent of the War: A. Thrush, 'Naval Finance and the Origins and Development of Ship Money', in *War and Government in Britain, 1598–1650*, ed. Mark Charles Fissel (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1991), pp. 133–62.
- 3 SP 16/2/f. 78
- 4 SP 16/5/f. 24.
- 5 *C.S.P.D. Charles I, 1625–1626*, I, 81, 89.
- 6 The extent of the impact of the corsairs on western Britain becomes evident when the Trinity House records for Deptford, which include repeated references to

- captivity, are contrasted with the records of Hull, on the north-eastern coast of England, which include only one reference: *Trinity House of Deptford Transactions, 1609–35*, ed. G. G. Harris (London: Record Society, 1983); *The First Order Book of the Hull Trinity House, 1632–1665*, ed. F. W. Brooks (Printed for the Society, 1942), p. 71.
- 7 Ibn Abi Dinar, *Kitab al-Mu'nis fi Akhbar Ifriqiyah wa Tunis*, ed. Muhammad Shammam (Tunis, 1967), p. 192.
 - 8 Henry de Castries, *Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc ... Archives et bibliothèques d'Angleterre* (Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1918–36), II, 565.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, II, 568.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, II, 577.
 - 11 C.S.P. *Domestic, Charles I, 1625–1626*, I, II; *Acts of the Privy Council, 1625–1626*, p. 243.
 - 12 *Acts of the Privy Council, Sept. 1627–June 1628*, p. 446.
 - 13 C.S.P. *Domestic, Charles I, 1625–26*, I, 343.
 - 14 *Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England*, 36 volumes (London, 1807), II, 109.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, p. 174.
 - 16 The Turks, he said. '... were still roving in the West, the Dunkerks in the East, the cries came out of all parts. Their losses great, their dangers more, their fears exceeding all. No merchant doth venture on the seas, hardly they thought themselves secure enough on land. It was alleged by some, that as the king's ships were stopped from going to relieve them when it was ordered by the council, so they were then. Though ready on the coasts, or in the harbours near them, where these rogues were most infectious, nothing might be done. Nay in some cases it was proved that the merchants had been taken even in the sight of the king's ships, and that the captain being importuned to relieve them, refused their protection or assistance, and said they were denied it by the instructions which they had.' Quoted in Philip Gosse, *The History of Piracy* (New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1995, first pub. 1932), p. 137.
 - 17 *Acts of the Privy Council, 1625–1626*, p. 480.
 - 18 See chapter 3 in B. E. Supple, *Commercial Crisis and Change in England 1600–1642* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959).
 - 19 Adam Anderson, *An Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce* (1801, reprinted New York, Augustus M. Kelly, 1967), II, 320. See also p. 333 for reference to another bribe in 1628.
 - 20 *Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, Part I* (London, HMSO, 1874), p. 14.
 - 21 See the study of these sermons by Margo Todd, 'A Captive's Story: Puritans, Pirates, and the Drama of Reconciliation', *The Seventeenth Century*, 12 (1997), 37–56.
 - 22 *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, II, 384.
 - 23 *Negotium Posterorum*, ed. Alexander B. Grosart (1881), p. 4; for the attack on Baltimore, see C. S. P. *Relating to Ireland, Charles I, 1625–1632*, ed. Robert Pentland Mahaffy (London, HMSO, 1900), pp. 621–3 and the detailed study by Henry Barnby, 'The Sack of Baltimore', *Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological Society*, 74 (1969), 101–29.
 - 24 Samuel R. Gardiner, *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1628–1660* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1889), p. 37.

- 25 For a discussion of Ship Money, see Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, pp. 583–598. There has been extensive debate about the King’s linkage of Ship Money to the war against pirates. The early nineteenth-century historian of English commerce, Adam Anderson, accepted the link, but Kenneth R. Andrews has maintained that ‘piracy and the Barbary corsairs ... clearly were not’ the main reason behind the Ship Money of the 1630s and the subsequent clash between the City merchants and the King. ‘Ship money was not about piracy’, he repeated, ‘but its promoters were clever enough politicians to realize that maritime England’ would respond willingly ‘to an appeal which gave prominence to the feared and hated Moor’, *Ships, Money and Politics*, p. 131. David Hebb disagreed and marshalled extensive evidence to prove his position: *Piracy and the English Government*, chapter 10. See also the study of the earlier levy by Robin J. W. Swales, ‘The Ship Money Levy of 1628’, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 50 (1977), 164–76.
- 26 See Brian Quintrell, ‘Charles I and his Navy in the 1630s’, *The Seventeenth Century*, 3 (1988), 159–179.
- 27 SP 16/298/50.
- 28 C.S.P.D. *Charles I, 1635*, VIII, 389, 608.
- 29 The statement by Sharpe that after 1636, ‘complaints about pirates appear to be much reduced’, ignores numerous reports to the contrary, *The Personal Rule*, p. 596.
- 30 SP 16/329/29. See other references to Barbary Corsair activities in 1636 in *Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts*, p. 291; *First Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts* (London, HMSO, 1870), p. 346.
- 31 Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 587.
- 32 *Compassion towards Captives, chiefly towards our Bretheren and Country-men who are in miserable bondage in BARBARIE* (Oxford, 1637).
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 See the letter from the Moroccan ruler to Charles: *Letter from the King of Morocco, to his Majesty the King of England Charles I for the reducing of Sally, Argiers, & c.* in which the Moroccan asked Charles for assistance. The letter was published twice, in 1680 and 1682, to support the monarchy’s attempts to establish amicable relations with Morocco.
- 35 De Castries, *Les Sources*, III, 325.
- 36 *The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Ambassador, Alkaid Jaurar Ben Abdella, with his Associate, Mr. Robert Blake* (1637), p. 25.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 38 Hebb suggests that the King may have been personally involved in the preparations for the ambassador: *Piracy and the English Government*, pp. 258–9.
- 39 *State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs ... Venice, (1636–39)*, XXIV, 256.
- 40 See my ‘Wives, Captive Husbands and Turks: The First Women Petitioners in Caroline England’, *Explorations in Renaissance Culture*, 23 (1997), 111–29.
- 41 On one occasion, Charles advised action on a petition four years after it had been presented to him, *Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts*, p. 292: ‘(1636): Copy Memorial for the King. The King having by a reference from Sir Sidney Montague dated 28 Feb. 1632, on a petition of many poor

- women declaring that more than 500 of their husbands, sons and friends were in bondage to the Turks and Moors of Algiers and Tunis; and supplicating the King to commiserate them, commanded the undersigned to devise means to redeem them.' In his indifference to the women and their petitions, the King was not unlike his father who also had not taken them seriously: see *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, ed. Norman Egbert McLure (Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 1939), II, 507: The 'wives, kindred, and friends' of the captives, 'do so importune his Majestie at all turnes, that he is forced sometimes to geve them hard usage both in wordes and worse', Letter to Sir Dudley Carleton, 12 July 1623.
- 42 *Cobbett's Parliamentary History*, II, 554.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 575.
- 44 J. R. Powell, *The Navy in the English Civil War* (London, Archon Books, 1962), p. 5.
- 45 *Journals of the House of Commons*, comp. Timothy Cunningham (1785), II, 48.
- 46 *Ibid.*, II, 152.
- 47 *The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes*, ed. Willson Havelock Coates (Archon Books, 1970, first publ. 1942), p. 54.
- 48 C.S.P.D., *Charles I, 1641–43*, XVIII, 119.
- 49 *The Journal of ... D'Ewes*, ed. Coates, pp. 117, 203, 221.
- 50 See the text and a study of the Remonstrance in John Forster, *The Debates on the Grand Remonstrance, November and December, 1641* (London, John Murray, 1860), especially pp. 228–29. See also Gardiner's assessment, *History of England from the Accession of James I. To the Outbreak of the Civil War* (London, Longmans, 1884), X, 59–61.
- 51 *The Journal of ... D'Ewes*, ed. Coates, p. 227.
- 52 *The Statutes of the Realm* (London, 1963), V, 134.
- 53 About 'renegadoes', see chapter 1 in my *Islam in Britain, 1558–1685* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 54 A. D. Innes, *The Maritime and Colonial Expansion of England under the Stuarts (1603–1714)* (London, Sampson Low, Marston & Co. Ltd., 1932), p. 6.
- 55 Leopold Von Ranke, *A History of England principally in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, AMS Press, Inc., rep. 1966), II, 231.
- 56 *The Journal of ... D'Ewes*, ed. Coates, p. 227.
- 57 Coates et al., *The Private Journals of the Long Parliament*, p. 85; see also p. 88.
- 58 *Ibid.*, pp. 144, 169.
- 59 Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution*, p. 312.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 336.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 457.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 560.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p. 227.
- 64 See *His Majesties Declaration to All His Loving Subjects of the 12 of August, 1642* in *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, ed. James F. Larkin and Paul I. Hughes (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), II, 844n.
- 65 Coates et al., *The Private Journals*, p. 429.
- 66 *Ibid.*, p. 429n.
- 67 *Ibid.*, p. 450.
- 68 Henry Robinson, *Libertas, or Reliefe to the English Captives in Algier* (1642), pp. 1, 4, 12.

- 69 *Journals of the House of Commons*, III, 155.
 70 *King Charles His Letter to the Great Turk* (1642), sig. A2v.
 71 *Report on Franciscan Manuscripts preserved at the Convent, Merchants' Quay, Dublin* (Dublin, HMSO, 1906), p. 187.
 72 *True Neues from our Navie, now at Sea* (1642), title page and p. 6.
 73 *Journals of the House of Commons*, III, 55–56.
 74 *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660*, ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait (London, HMSO, 1911), I, 134–5.
 75 *C.S.P.D. Charles I, 1644*, XIX, 285.
 76 *Journals of the House of Commons*, III, 664; *Acts and Ordinances*, ed. Firth, I, 553–4.
 77 *Journals of the House of Commons*, III, 718.
 78 *Acts and Ordinances*, ed. Firth, I, 610.
 79 *Journals of the House of Commons*, IV, 196; *Acts and Ordinances*, ed. Firth, I, 731.
 80 *Acts and Ordinances*, ed. Firth, I, 732.
 81 *C.S.P. and Manuscripts ... Venice, 1643–1647*, XXVII, 209.
 82 *A Relation of the whole proceedings concerning the Redemption of CAPTIVES in Argier and Tunis* (1647), p. 5.
 83 *Ibid.*, p. 6. It is interesting that while the Algerian and Tunisian rulers were willing to view Parliament as the sole power in England, the Moroccan ruler, Mulay Al-Sheikh, who still recalled the assistance of Charles to him in 1637, refused. When captives were taken by Moroccan pirates in 1646, Mulay refused to 'accept any ransom but a letter from the King of England for their redemption'. The wives petitioned Parliament for a pass to go to the King 'in the Isle of Wight, to petition His Majesty for a letter to the King of Morocco', *Seventh Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. Part I* (London, HMSO, 1879), p. 38.
 84 *A Relation of the whole proceedings*, p. 11.
 85 Thomas Sweet, *Dear friends: It is now about sixe yeares since I was most unfortunately taken by a Turkes man of Warre, on the Coasts of Barbary captive into Argiere* (London, 1647).
 86 *Ibid.*
 87 *Ibid.*
 88 Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics 1621–1629* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 2.

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