

## ‘Chimeres, monopoles and stratagems’: French Exiles in the Spanish Netherlands during the Thirty Years’ War

In July 1631 Marie de’ Medici, the queen mother of Louis XIII of France, arrived in the Spanish Netherlands as an exile. After passing through various towns she made her entry to the capital of Brussels in the company of the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia. According to the queen mother’s official apologist, Jean Puget de la Serre, the spectacular event was marked with the pomp and ceremony reserved for a visiting sovereign: as they entered the city, the bells of the city churches were rung, the local elites turned out in regiments of civic guards and confraternities, and formal speeches were made in Marie de’ Medici’s honour. Standing before the queen mother, the Chevalier and Pensionary of Brussels welcomed her to Brussels as the first queen-consort of France since Eleanor, elder sister of Charles V and second wife of Francis I, had visited the city nearly a century before.<sup>1</sup>

Marie de’ Medici’s self-imposed exile deepened the rift within the French royal family that had already been exposed following the Day of Dupes (10–11 March 1630), and which was worsened by the tensions between Louis XIII and his younger brother, Gaston d’Orléans, who himself had left France for Lorraine. Attention from around the courts of Europe understandably focused at this crucial political juncture on the divided Bourbon House. Apparently surprised by Marie de’ Medici’s arrival, the Infanta Isabella wrote to her nephew, Philip IV, expressing her uncertainty about the wider consequences of the queen mother’s exile and of Gaston’s attempts to seek aid from Spain, while the papal inter-nuncio in Brussels went further in reporting the fears expressed that Richelieu might actually use the exile of the Bourbons as a pretext to attack the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>2</sup> In the meantime, the Spanish ambassador to the papal court, Diego Saavedra y Fajardo, reported the concerns felt in Rome over the possibility of renewed Habsburg aggression in Europe in the wake of Bourbon divisions.<sup>3</sup>

The fears of the papal court were not totally unfounded. For the Spanish regime in Madrid, still smarting after the massive setbacks in the recent north Italian war over Mantua and Monferrato, the Bourbon split presented

potential opportunities for applying pressure against Richelieu, even though the same concerns about provoking France into open war were again raised.<sup>4</sup> In the summer of 1631 the pro-Habsburg Savoyard agent Abbot Alessandro Scaglia travelled to London as extraordinary ambassador of Spain, and while publicly the Spanish offered to mediate between the queen mother, Gaston and Louis XIII, Scaglia carried secret instructions for organising a coalition against Richelieu with England, Savoy and Lorraine in support of the exiled Bourbons.<sup>5</sup> To the Count-Duke Olivares, commenting with a typical rhetorical flourish in November 1631 on the state of Spain's fortunes in Europe and Scaglia's mission to Charles I, it seemed 'that the most critical point in current affairs has arrived'.<sup>6</sup>

The split in the Bourbon House and the exile of Louis XIII's mother and brother were of considerable importance both to France and to the wider fortunes of international relations during the Thirty Years' War. Yet while the broad narrative of the episode is generally known, the issues raised by their act of going into exile has received little more than a cursory examination, aside from the disorganised and anecdotal study by the Belgian historian Ernest Gossart, and Paul Henrard's now-dated and limited work on Marie de' Medici.<sup>7</sup> Michel Carmona, the queen mother's most recent biographer, affords probably the best treatment of the period, though his book also reveals a relative lack of research in Belgian archives and only scant work on Spanish material, while Georges Dethan has correspondingly neglected Gaston's years in exile in his biography of the prince, effectively picking up the narrative on his return to France in October 1634.<sup>8</sup> There is indeed still relatively little scholarly literature in English on the Spanish Netherlands. Only with the recent commemoration in Brussels of the four-hundredth anniversary of the archducal marriage has this historiographical lacuna been significantly addressed.<sup>9</sup>

The Spanish Netherlands was a nerve-centre of the Habsburg dynastic system, and Brussels, the archducal capital, was the 'true heart of seventeenth century Spanish espionage'.<sup>10</sup> The reasons for this are not hard to find. The Low Countries was a border region, the point of contact between different but crucial theatres of European power politics and trade, and this remained true for the Spanish Netherlands in the early seventeenth century under the archdukes. The rebellious Dutch provinces that comprised the United Provinces were of course to the north, while England and the North Sea represented a second political and economic arena. To the south lay France, with the Holy Roman Empire to the east (though juridically, the Low Countries remained within the limits of the Empire).

It should be added however that while the Spanish Netherlands was crucial to the system of Habsburg power in Europe, the region was nevertheless confronted by certain logistical problems, surrounded as it was by hostile powers. This was most evident in the transmission of information to and from the Spanish Netherlands, of undoubted importance for the region and,

more broadly, for the mechanics of Spanish Habsburg power. Since the sixteenth century a number of postal routes had been in operation linking different parts of the composite monarchy, the most important of which were the routes through the land corridors of the 'Spanish Road', and the overland route through France where letters often passed through Paris and the Spanish embassy in Paris. Following the conclusion of the Anglo-Spanish war in 1630, a sea route through the English Channel was also opened, where officially neutral English ships were commonly employed for added security.

Information to and from the Spanish Netherlands was nevertheless subject to interception, increasingly so during the 1630s when Marie de' Medici and Gaston d'Orléans were resident in exile. The English diplomat Arthur Hopton, for one, noted during his mission to Madrid that couriers from Brussels were repeatedly stopped and robbed of their letters while passing through France.<sup>11</sup> Following the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish war in May 1635 the overland route via Paris was effectively closed as the Spanish embassy ceased to operate, and there was increased pressure on the other land routes. Correspondingly, the sea route itself became less secure, even for neutral shipping; in a letter to Olivares written soon after the outbreak of the war with France, the agent Alessandro Scaglia wrote from Brussels that 'I received your letter of the twelfth of last month with the extraordinary [courier] together with the duplicate of the twenty-seventh of September, which did not arrive because it was said that the French seized the courier who was travelling on an English ship. Consequently, fewer instructions arrive from Spain.'<sup>12</sup>

As this clearly indicates, couriers operating from the Spanish Netherlands were themselves potential targets of hostile powers, and this danger was brutally underlined during the 1630s. In negotiating from Brussels, the exiled Marie de' Medici employed her own couriers and agents who included French exiles from among her entourage. Two of them, Baron Hayes de Courmenin and Monsieur Clausel (Clausel had been a client and envoy of the Huguenot duc de Rohan during the 1620s) were captured with their correspondence by French soldiers after leaving the Spanish Netherlands. Lacking any of the diplomatic protection they might have enjoyed if they had been couriers of formally recognised sovereigns or even of accredited ambassadors, they were both quickly executed.<sup>13</sup>

Certainly, then, the location of the Spanish Netherlands in northern Europe had consequences for the processes of information-gathering and, more importantly, for its role within the system of Habsburg territories. Yet a geo-strategic interpretation of the Spanish Netherlands affords only a partial understanding of its identity in early modern Europe. The marriage in 1598 joining the Infanta Isabella, the elder daughter of Philip II, and Archduke Albert, a brother of the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf, transformed the region politically and culturally. Between the death of Don Carlos in 1568 and the birth of the future Philip III in 1578, Isabella was an

heir presumptive of the Spanish sovereign, acutely concerned with the fragility of his family line. Isabella's marriage twenty years after the birth of Philip served as compensation, albeit much delayed compensation, since she no longer appeared likely to transmit her father's patrimony. Philip II stipulated in the act governing the marriage that if the Archdukes were to have a male Catholic child of their own then the Spanish Netherlands would devolve by primogeniture to their family; correspondingly, if they had no male heirs then authority would, by the act, return to the male head of the main branch of the Spanish Habsburgs.<sup>14</sup>

Aside from compensating Isabella, the marriage may well have served other strategic interests. By detaching the Spanish Netherlands, if Rafael Valladares is to be believed, Philip II was in fact seeking to strengthen the power of the composite monarchy in northern Europe by reducing the burden of Spain's immediate international commitments and also re-adjusting Spain's relations with France, England and the emerging United Provinces.<sup>15</sup> Valladares goes further by arguing that Philip II's willingness to divide his patrimonial territories through the marriage of Albert and Isabella was only one of a number of projects contemplated in the course of both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for altering the relationship between the Low Countries and the composite monarchy. Crucially, however, it seems that none these projects envisaged the total end of Spanish involvement in the Low Countries. The archducal project of 1598 was fundamentally a dynastic allocation of territory to a junior branch of the Habsburg House rather than a complete break from Spanish dominion.<sup>16</sup>

Accordingly, Albert and Isabella's marriage complicated the status of the Spanish Netherlands as a potentially independent sovereignty. After 1598 the court of Madrid was careful to ensure some administrative influence over the region through the *Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre*, which, with its counterpart in Spain, functioned as a modified successor to the pre-marriage *Consejo Supremo de Flandes y Borgoña*.<sup>17</sup> The Spanish regime also maintained direct control of the army of Flanders, together with the appointment of the army's captain-general – the arrival of Ambrogio Spínola in the Low Countries in 1604, and his eventual assumption of the command of the army of Flanders following Albert's failure to re-capture Ostend, served as a clear indication of Spain's continuing military power in the region.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, while Isabella enjoyed the title of duchess of Burgundy, the ducal title itself did not pass to Albert as her husband but instead continued in the main branch of the Spanish Habsburgs, ensuring that Philip II and his heirs retained control of the sovereign Burgundian order of the *Toison d'Or*.<sup>19</sup>

These were admittedly limitations on the full independent sovereignty of the archdukes. Yet for the first time since Philip II had left the Low Countries in 1556, the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands enjoyed effective resident sovereigns, and following their marriage the archducal couple appropriately established their own court (indeed, the archdukes were the first sovereigns

of the Burgundian territories and the Franche Comté alone since 1477). Household institutions associated with a functioning Burgundian court were accordingly activated and placed under their control, and the so-called Colateral Councils, principally the *Conseil des Finances*, the *Conseil Privé* and the *Conseil d'État*, also came under archducal authority.<sup>20</sup> The Spanish Netherlands furthermore enjoyed some diplomatic recognition, an attribute of discrete sovereignty generally overlooked by historians but one which distinguished the region from other areas within the Spanish composite monarchy. The English crown, for instance, began to send accredited representatives to the archducal court from 1600, and in turn representatives were sent from Brussels to London. Indeed, the court at Brussels retained its diplomatic status even after the death of Albert in 1621 when, according to the marriage act, effective sovereign control of the Spanish Netherlands should have returned to the main branch of the Spanish Habsburgs and Isabella's status demoted from Archduchess to Governess.<sup>21</sup>

The Spanish Netherlands remained integral to the Spanish composite monarchy after 1598 yet it simultaneously emerged as a semi-independent sovereignty in its own right, with important consequences for its role in European power politics. In the first instance the strategic priorities of Brussels and Madrid did not always coincide, implying that the relationship between the two courts during the reign of the archdukes was at times like that between Madrid and the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty in Vienna. After succeeding his father, Philip III repeatedly tested the limits of archducal power by aggravating the relationship between his court and that in Brussels, even though he had formally accepted the provisions of the marriage act prior to the death of Philip II.<sup>22</sup> For their part, the archdukes seemed more than capable of pursuing diplomatic initiatives without the immediate permission of Madrid. As Pauline Croft has observed, 'the increasing confidence of Albert and Isabella in conducting their own foreign policies was all too apparent' during the preliminary negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish peace of 1604.<sup>23</sup> Only a few years later, the Twelve Years' Truce of 1609 with the Dutch was willingly signed in Antwerp by the archdukes representing Spain. The Spanish Netherlands, after all, was on the front line of the gruelling war of attrition between the United Provinces and Spain, and Albert and Isabella (and eventually Spínola too) were far more conscious than policy-makers in Madrid of the acute difficulty of militarily defeating the Dutch, and consequently more willing to negotiate with them.<sup>24</sup>

It would be wrong however to overstate the differences between Brussels and Madrid. The dominant impression of the two Habsburg courts during the archducal period is of dynastic and political intimacy. In itself this could afford significant diplomatic possibilities both to the Spanish and other European powers as informal negotiations with Spain could be pursued through Brussels without necessarily attracting unwelcome attention or criticism. The first tentative steps in the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations of 1627 took

place through the court in Brussels rather than Madrid, in part because England and Spain were formally at war, making any direct negotiations between London and Madrid politically sensitive. The double identity of the Spanish Netherlands as a semi-independent sovereignty and a Habsburg territory likewise facilitated informal peace negotiations between the Spanish and Dutch after the resumption of conflict in 1621.<sup>25</sup>

While the Spanish Netherlands emerged as an arena for informal negotiations during the early seventeenth century, it was also one of the most attractive destinations for religious and political exiles in Europe. In fact well before the archducal marriage, following the accession of Elizabeth I in 1558, the Catholic Low Countries was established as a principal refuge for recusants fleeing England, and English and Scottish colleges were accordingly established at Douai.<sup>26</sup> At the same time there was a comparable traffic of exiles between Ireland and the Spanish Netherlands, and they too had a college at the university town of Leuven which enjoyed a particularly fruitful period at the end of the sixteenth century.<sup>27</sup> The attractions of the Spanish Netherlands to Catholic exiles from the British Isles, at least after 1598, were fairly clear. Not only did it enjoy an advantageous geographical position on the North Sea, but it also afforded a relatively warm welcome to those fleeing persecution for their faith. The confessional sensibilities of Albert and Isabella placed them at the vanguard of the Catholic revival in northern Europe; during their reign they oversaw the revitalisation of the church in the Spanish Netherlands, and they also lent their support to the English and Irish colleges, as well as to specific recusants who had taken residence at their court.<sup>28</sup>

Given its geo-strategic significance and its semi-separation from the Spanish composite monarchy, the Spanish Netherlands was ideally placed for exiles who wished to remain in contact with their home states while negotiating a settlement or encouraging disorder within those states. The proximity of the Spanish Netherlands to France certainly made the region an accessible and important destination for French political refugees. The border was within easy reach of Paris and the French court during moments of internal crisis, a point made by Marie de' Medici herself: 'I regarded this place as nearby haven, where I could flee the storm that was unsettling me.'<sup>29</sup> Moreover, as a semi-separate sovereignty, it could, at least while France and Spain were formally at peace, be viewed as a neutral refuge where an exile could enjoy the backing of Spain without arguably being in Spanish territory proper. In justifying his flight from France to the archducal court in 1631, Père Chanteloupe for one drew a clear distinction between Spain and the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>30</sup>

Strikingly, those drawn to exile in the Spanish Netherlands ranged across the social spectrum to include individuals who were themselves of sovereign status or members of sovereign dynasties, even though the incidence of such exiles was relatively low in the early modern period. For example, in 1634 Prince Thomas Carignano, the younger brother of the duke of Savoy,

disobeyed the duke's instruction to travel to France and instead entered self-imposed exile, taking a command in the Spanish army of Flanders; in 1652 the exiled Charles Stuart spent several months in Brussels, returning to the city in 1659 before his restoration to the English throne; finally, Christina of Sweden spent the summer of 1654 in the Spanish Netherlands following her abdication from her throne, and she was first received in the Roman Catholic church, albeit in private, by the archbishop of Mechelen.<sup>31</sup>

Despite such spectacular examples of elite exiles, early modern historians have generally been slow to integrate the subject of exile into general accounts of political history, apart from the considerable research on the Stuarts after their flight from England in 1689.<sup>32</sup> Exile as both a state and a process was far from straightforward. It covered different categories, subtly shaded by a range of meanings; a person could enter self-imposed exile, suffer internal exile within his or her home state, he or she could be disgraced from court or, in more extreme instances, be exiled abroad. All of these implied varying levels of disgrace or disfavour which accordingly entailed different political dynamics. Crucially, exile was reversible, like the punishment of execution in effigy, and did not necessarily imply the end of a public career or alternatively total isolation from a home state. Lines of communication could remain open between exiles and their political allies or families remaining in their home states; states and sovereigns themselves could employ exiles to maintain informal diplomatic channels with other states, raising the possibility that an exile could return to favour by showing loyalty or by operating on behalf of his or her home state while in exile.

Exile was potentially useful as a political tool, through which ministers, courtiers and their families could serve their own interests in times of crisis. Cardinal Mazarin's spectacular departure from the French court on two occasions into self-imposed exile to the Imperial city of Cologne succeeded in undermining his Frondeurs opponents, and he only returned the second time, by Louis XIV's invitation in October 1652, when his enemies had effectively torn themselves apart.<sup>33</sup> In two other similar examples, the Épernon and Condé families seemingly employed exile to safeguard their collective interests at times of internal crisis in France during the first half of the seventeenth century. In 1638, Bernard, duc de la Valette, a son of Épernon and a nephew of Richelieu by marriage, fled France and the threat of execution, travelling to England, while following the collapse of the Fronde Louis II de Condé, the so-called 'Grand Condé', went into exile in the Spanish Netherlands at the head of his personal army.<sup>34</sup>

Assessing the extent to which such strategies existed, and the amount of contact between exiles and their family clans is, however, difficult since for quite understandable reasons these strategies were often left unwritten. The Scaglia family, an elite noble clan from the duchy of Savoy of central importance to the politics of the ducal court, was divided during the 1630s at a time when the sovereign House, facing dynastic uncertainty, was itself split over

balancing France and Spain. The head of the Scaglia family remained in Turin, loyal to the duke who was in alliance with France, while in 1632 the younger brother, Abbot Alessandro Scaglia, went into self-imposed exile in the Spanish Netherlands to work informally as an agent of Olivares and the main point of contact between Madrid, Brussels and the French exiles. No archival evidence demonstrates for certain that the family had a pre-organised strategy for placing members in French and Spanish factional camps during this period of acute political uncertainty, but much is implicit. After leaving the formal service of Savoy, Abbot Scaglia was visited in 1634 by two of his three nephews who themselves temporarily entered Spanish service; it seems that the family was dealing with uncertainty and spreading its options by placing relatives in competing political camps, possibly with the tacit acceptance of the ducal regime, which could itself benefit from informal cross-factional contacts.<sup>35</sup> In cases of elite families like the Scaglia, exile could function positively within the structures of domestic and international politics as a means of dealing with acute uncertainty. The use of exile as a political tool was most certainly risky, yet it could also potentially yield significant benefits.

This precarious balance inherent in self-imposed political exile can be examined through the example of Marie de' Medici and Gaston d'Orléans in the Spanish Netherlands; it is on them as a case study of political exile that the rest of this article will focus. In fact to speak of Marie de' Medici and Gaston in exile is also to speak of a larger collection of other individuals who left France with the two Bourbons as their patrons and protectors. As was expected of someone of such exceptional status, Marie de' Medici entered exile in the company of her own entourage, and an important document from Simancas provides valuable information not only about its size and composition but also about the identities of leading individuals.<sup>36</sup> The entourage comprised at least two hundred and four people, among them 'gentlemen' and administrative staff associated with a functioning household, such as doctors, treasurers and two confessors, personal guards and servants. These included established opponents of Richelieu, such as Père Suffran who had been Louis XIII's confessor, and Mathieu de Montagues, the abbé de S. Germain, who was the queen mother's official polemicist and almoner, and who in 1632 published a collection of documents and letters in defence of her exile that made him a 'criminal of the first rank', according to Richelieu.<sup>37</sup> Perhaps still more important among her male followers was Père Chanteloupe, who assumed the position of her leading advisor having been exiled and condemned to death in his absence from France on the charge first of *lèse majesté* and then of plotting against Richelieu.<sup>38</sup> For obvious reasons Marie de' Medici's entourage also contained a strong contingent of female nobles. Again these included opponents of the cardinal, the most important being the duchesse d'Ognano, who was the daughter of the duc de Mayenne and a member of the Guise family and who had been exiled from the French court in February 1631.<sup>39</sup>

Given the level of her status, the queen mother posed a thorny problem for her hosts about of what type of recognition she should be accorded. It certainly seems, at least initially, that the Infanta for one was willing to recognise Marie de' Medici as a visiting sovereign. In his rather coloured account, Jean Puget de la Serre recorded that the queen mother's public arrival in Brussels was marked, 'with as much astonishment as pleasure', by the ringing of the great bell of the city belfry of Saint Nicholas for two hours, 'which is never sounded other than for the entries of sovereign princes [qui ne sonne jamais qu'aux entrées des Princes Souverains du Pays]'. De la Serre emphasised still further the warmth of the Infanta's welcome on the frontispiece of his work which depicted the two widows embracing one another in a show of mutual affection, Isabella, as was her custom, in her Franciscan habit and the queen mother flanked by angels offering symbolic closed crowns for her head, with the iconographical suggestion of royal status.<sup>40</sup>

In the following year the process of recognition was carried forward by Abbot Scaglia, then operating from Brussels as the confidant and informal agent of Olivares. In June 1632, the abbot petitioned Olivares for the formal rank of Spanish ordinary ambassador to the queen mother, even though it was generally expected that her stay in the Spanish Netherlands would be brief (Scaglia's letter appears to have been lost).<sup>41</sup> It was at this point, however, that the regime in Madrid responded, diverging from Isabella's policy of implicit recognition of Marie de' Medici's sovereignty. The Spanish were certainly willing to pay the queen mother a pension while she was in the Catholic Netherlands (as they were for Gaston), but they were less forthcoming on the matter of diplomatic recognition. In a revealing letter to his aunt, Philip IV argued that while Marie de' Medici had once been the ruling queen of France, Scaglia could not be commissioned as an accredited ambassador because she had no 'sovereign status [estado de gobierno]'. In rejecting Scaglia's request, the king added that he did not want to offend her, 'only that it seems in this matter to be excessive and would generate controversy over nothing'. Scaglia had to content himself with the position of an informal mediator between the queen mother and Madrid, albeit the most important point of contact between the two.<sup>42</sup>

Whether Philip IV was suggesting that Marie de' Medici, as the queen-consort of Henry IV, had never in fact enjoyed intrinsic sovereignty, or that she had somehow lost it following the death of her husband, is not entirely clear. Appropriately enough, this reflected the general uncertainty over her status; when a similar situation arose in 1635 over whether the queen mother could send Luca Fabroni as an official agent to the papal court, the French indeed argued that she had only enjoyed such status through her marriage, in response to which a pamphlet appeared asserting her inviolable sovereignty:

The queen is a princess by birth, and the daughter of a sovereign. She is a queen by marriage, and as such a sovereign princess: she has been crowned and anointed, confirming all the rights of sovereignty.<sup>43</sup>

The problems of definition surrounding Marie de' Medici's status illustrated the much broader problem of how host powers should receive political exiles. The issue was a potential diplomatic minefield, especially so for those claiming sovereign status or from ruling dynasties because of the international attention they attracted. By restricting recognition of the queen mother the Spanish were, so far as they were concerned, seeking to avoid a potentially inflexible ceremonial precedent which seemingly outweighed the political advantages they might have enjoyed by elevating her. That the issue of ceremonial status for exiles from sovereign dynasties could be problematic was further illustrated when in 1652 the exiled prince de Condé arrived in Brussels following the collapse of the Frondes in France. Louis II de Condé, a prince of the blood at the head of a personal army raised in France, demanded an exceptional, perhaps excessive, level of recognition, claiming that he was subject to no authority in Brussels. This clearly rankled with the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Archduke Leopold William, who was himself the son of Emperor Ferdinand II. The resulting ceremonial impasse meant that when the two male members of sovereign dynasties first met they had to do so from their respective carriages to avoid a dispute over precedence.<sup>44</sup>

Perhaps because he had not been a crowned sovereign, these ceremonial questions appear not to have surrounded Gaston d'Orléans when in November 1632 he returned to the Spanish Netherlands following the failure of the Montmorency rebellion.<sup>45</sup> Like his mother, Gaston was nevertheless accorded a high level of status, and as a male member of a sovereign dynasty he was appropriately lodged on his arrival in the apartments of the dead Archduke Albert at the Coudenberg Palace.<sup>46</sup> He was also accompanied by his own entourage, which accordingly included a strong male presence, principally the duc d'Elbeuf, and Antoine de Puylaurens.<sup>47</sup> Charles II de Lorraine, duc d'Elbeuf, was the head of a cadet branch of the Guise family, placing him in the highest echelons of the French aristocracy, and he fitted into a pattern of elite noble opposition to Cardinal Richelieu together with other members of the main branch of the Guise clan. In 1631 he had left France with Orléans, witnessing Gaston's secret marriage to Margaret of Lorraine in 1632, and Elbeuf had also taken a command of the rebels during the Montmorency rebellion, as a consequence of which he was condemned to death in his absence by the *Parlement* of Burgundy and stripped of the *Saint Esprit*.<sup>48</sup> His wife, Catherine-Henriette de Bourbon, was the sister of another of Richelieu's opponents, César, duc de Vendôme, and an illegitimate daughter of Henry IV, and she had also been exiled from the French court in 1631, along with two other ladies-in-waiting of Louis XIII's queen-consort, Anne of Austria.<sup>49</sup>

Antoine de Puylaurens was himself a deeply enigmatic figure. Indeed, there has been no secondary study of him at all, despite his seeming importance within the context of French court history. What is known is that his own social background was in marked contrast to that of Elbeuf. From a relatively

humble social background, Puylaurens had gained all of his influence and standing as a follower of the duc d'Orléans, emerging during the 1620s first as an *enfant d'honneur* and then as Gaston's 'principal confidant'.<sup>50</sup> Though much more work is needed on him, it is evident that he always remained totally dependent on Gaston, guarding his position as a favoured client of the prince with some jealousy. This in itself had important consequences both for his role among the French exiles in Brussels and the way in which outside powers, including the courts in Brussels and Madrid, dealt with Gaston.<sup>51</sup>

The return of the prince to Brussels signalled growing tensions among the French exiles as they began to gravitate around the queen mother and Gaston, with Chanteloupe and Puylaurens effectively acting as their respective representatives. At the same time, the exiled Savoyard ambassador Abbot Scaglia was established as the informal point of contact between Olivares and the French exiles, reporting directly to the count-duke and concerned with gathering information and organising the exiles into an effective opposition to Cardinal Richelieu.<sup>52</sup> In practice, however, this proved extremely difficult. As it has been seen, the logistics of transmitting information to and from the Spanish Netherlands during the 1630s complicated the management and mobilisation of French exiles. However by itself this was not the most serious of problems, for it soon became clear that the French exiles were their own worst enemies. Writing at the end of 1635, the English diplomatic agent in Brussels, Balthasar Gerbier, astutely observed that '[I]n a world of Chimeres, Monopoles and Stratagemes [*sic*] these poor exiled are involved, all seeming to long for a deliverance, and all contributing to the contrary'.<sup>53</sup> There is perhaps no better summary of the intense political disorder, squabbles and private duels that divided the community of French exiles and prevented them from organising into a coherent force between the return of Gaston to the Spanish Netherlands in November 1632 and his reconciliation with Louis XIII in October 1634.<sup>54</sup>

The most divisive of issues was undoubtedly the friction between the queen mother and Gaston d'Orléans. From the very moment that Gaston returned to the Spanish Netherlands in November 1632 it was all too clear that relations between mother and son were going to prove difficult. Marie de' Medici made no secret of her displeasure at Gaston's acceptance of the treaty of Béziers from which she felt she had been excluded, and when Gaston sent Madame de Fargis ahead to meet his mother before his arrival at the archducal capital, she refused to accept her, claiming that she was of unsuitably low birth; instead the queen mother withdrew, albeit temporarily, from Brussels to Malines and Ghent as an apparent snub to her son.<sup>55</sup> More serious difficulties soon emerged. For both mother and son, as for so many exiles, their exile represented little more than another means of pursuing political objectives solely relating to France, even though they had to appeal to Brussels and Madrid for support and financial aid. Ostensibly this meant treating for a reconciliation with Louis XIII since, as Richelieu

could potentially argue, the divisions within the Bourbon House were a matter for their concern as blood relatives and not for him as a mere minister.<sup>56</sup> Of course Richelieu remained the fundamental source of contention, as he had been before their exile. Because the queen mother and Gaston usually negotiated without co-operating or consulting each other, they viewed one other with a mixture of suspicion and fear; if one settled individually with the cardinal, then the other could have been left in a significantly weaker and more isolated political position.<sup>57</sup>

The emerging differences between Marie de' Medici and Gaston were accordingly reflected in the fact that both mother and son sought to utilise their individual, rather than collective, political assets to underline their international importance and to increase their leverage while negotiating with Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu. Marie de' Medici's influence was essentially indirect. While she was long-established as a figurehead of opposition to the cardinal, she was of possibly greater importance as the mother of the queen of England and the duchess of Savoy. It was certainly possible that her senior dynastic position could be used to bring about a reconciliation between the Habsburgs and Bourbons as part of a broader European peace among the Catholic powers, one of her longed-for aspirations. A more dangerous alternative, and one not readily appreciated in secondary accounts, was that her exile presented opportunities for Spain to improve diplomatic relations with England and Savoy and detach them from alliance with France; if this were achieved it would have proved a strategic disaster for Richelieu, restricting French access to the Italian peninsula and perhaps drawing England back into the European conflict. This had certainly been Spain's agenda when Scaglia had been dispatched on his extraordinary mission to London in the spring of 1631.<sup>58</sup>

Like his mother, Gaston's intrinsic importance was dynastic. In a meeting of the Spanish council of state in 1633 Olivares outlined the evident problems of dealing with Orléans, but also expressed a moral obligation to provide him with both aid and employment because, he claimed, it befitted Philip IV to help a prince who had placed himself under Spain's protection.<sup>59</sup> This seems laudable in itself, though there were also more compelling, self-interested, reasons for the Spanish to support Gaston, and indeed for Richelieu to negotiate a settlement with him. Until the birth of the future Louis XIV in 1638, Orléans was immediately in line to the French throne, and as a consequence he was better placed to generate substantial armed opposition to Richelieu or conversely to dash any such opposition if he settled unilaterally with Paris, despite the abject failure of the Montmorency revolt.<sup>60</sup> His military potential was certainly reflected in the fact that the Spanish regime in Madrid was willing to pay Gaston to command a military incursion into France, even though members of the council of state suspected (with some justice) that he could not be trusted to lead consistent opposition to Richelieu.<sup>61</sup>

Nevertheless for both Marie de' Medici and Gaston, negotiating with

Louis XIII and Richelieu was always problematic. The queen mother, it seems, was unable to reconcile herself to the cardinal during the 1630s. Louis XIII had already made it clear on the Day of Dupes that he would not dispense with his cardinal-minister's services, and his decision to retain Richelieu was reiterated to the exiled Marie de' Medici.<sup>62</sup> So long as the cardinal stayed in office it therefore seemed unlikely that the queen mother would return from exile, in spite of regular contact with Paris through informal negotiations. Moreover, the longer she remained in exile, the more apparent it became that she was not in fact a significant threat to Richelieu. Alessandro Scaglia's negotiations in London during 1631 had yielded nothing, and neither England nor Savoy were consequently engaged in a grand alliance with Spain on behalf of the exiled Bourbons. Charles I was perhaps willing, though not able, to offer practical support to Spain after the termination of Parliament in 1629, while Duke Victor Amadeus of Savoy was openly reluctant to be drawn back into confrontation with France so soon after the conclusion of the war for Mantua and Monferrato.<sup>63</sup>

Gaston's difficulties in seeking a reconciliation, on the other hand, were ostensibly more serious, since his political trump card as Louis XIII's immediate heir also proved to be his greatest problem. Given the possibility that he might succeed his elder brother to the French throne and then transmit the succession to his own heirs, Gaston's marital status remained amongst the most sensitive issues in French domestic politics. That had already been demonstrated when in 1626 he had married the exceptionally wealthy widow Madame de Montpensier, a union that was acceptable to Richelieu but which had caused a rupture in the French nobility.<sup>64</sup> Montpensier had died in 1627, and Gaston's secret marriage in January 1632 to Margaret, the sister of Duke Charles IV of Lorraine, was if anything even more controversial given Lorraine's ever-fragile dynastic and political relations with France. Richelieu's subsequent attempts to annul the marriage bear witness to his concerns over its political implications both for France and for himself, and while Gaston and Margaret were married, the chances of a reconciliation between the prince and his elder brother were correspondingly affected.<sup>65</sup> This problem was worsened following the occupation of the duchy in August 1633, for in the following month Gaston's bride, Margaret, arrived as an exile in Brussels, and in May 1634 she was joined by her sister, Henriette de Vaudement, the princess of Phalsbourg.<sup>66</sup> Gaston and his Lorraine bride were thus together, and potentially capable of producing a male heir.

The arrival of members of the House of Lorraine in the Spanish Netherlands also did little to improve relations between Marie de' Medici and Gaston, though the queen mother in fact viewed Margaret of Lorraine as a potential asset to strengthen her position with Gaston. If Orléans were to negotiate his return to France then her own bargaining power with Richelieu may well have been reduced, even though, it seems, she had no intention of co-operating with her younger son; it was therefore important for the queen

mother not only to continue her own efforts for a personal settlement but also to stall those of her exiled son. Given Richelieu's unequivocal opposition to the Lorraine marriage, one potential way of doing this was through Gaston's bride.<sup>67</sup> The benefits afforded to the queen mother by the presence of Margaret of Lorraine were in fact twofold. Not only did she present opportunities for keeping Gaston away from France, and thus in opposition to Richelieu, but she also had the potential to divide the prince from Puylaurens, the importance of which was clear.<sup>68</sup> As Gaston's favourite and effective spokesman, Puylaurens assumed an active role in the negotiations for a settlement with Louis XIII through Richelieu, and for his part, the cardinal had effectively identified Puylaurens as a tool for dividing the French exiles in Brussels by offering the favourite incentives for obtaining Gaston's reconciliation with Louis XIII.<sup>69</sup>

Margaret of Lorraine's sister, the princess of Phalsbourg, also wanted to isolate Gaston from his favourite. As with Puylaurens, more research is needed on the mysterious princess of Phalsbourg – even the number of times she married is not known for certainty, though her marriage to Louis de Guise, a bastard son of Cardinal Louis of Lorraine, and the consequent foundation of the semi-autonomous principality of Phalsbourg, meant that her own position was far from secure, with a blemished social and political pedigree. Accordingly, her kinship with her sister assumed great importance given the marriage with Gaston, which provided her with a potential source of power that could be used from exile in the Spanish Netherlands to secure the restoration of both Lorraine and the principality of Phalsbourg. This strategy depended on the continuation of Gaston's exile until those expectations could be met, which by extension Puylaurens was threatening through the negotiations with Richelieu.<sup>70</sup>

Phalsbourg's enmity towards Puylaurens also assumed a personal dimension. While Gaston had been in Lorraine it seems that Phalsbourg had conferred her favour on Puylaurens, who responded by sporting her colours with the motto *fidélité*. This proved a cruel irony. Phalsbourg's affections had turned into a mortal hatred after the arrival of Puylaurens in Brussels, as all observers seemingly agreed, because of his new-found interest in a daughter of the princess of Chimay, a sister to the duke of Egmont and amongst the elite of the Walloon aristocracy.<sup>71</sup> Indeed, Puylaurens's attraction to the Chimay daughter itself became a source of considerable local scandal.<sup>72</sup> In May 1633 Charles d'Arenberg, a capuchin monk and the younger brother of the duke of Aerschot, complained to the Infanta on behalf of relatives about the unseemly level of attention given to the Chimay daughters, who were also his nieces.<sup>73</sup> On leaving his audience with Isabella, the capuchin stumbled after hitting the leg of one of the exiles, an individual called Boisivon, who was loitering in a chamber outside. Arenberg immediately assumed that he had been deliberately tripped while the French exiles who were assembled there, laughing throughout, maintained that it was simply an

accident. Arenberg was understandably less amused, as were the local nobles; Balthasar Gerbier later recorded that a Walloon nobleman gathered a mob to attack Boisivon and any French exiles known to be his friend.<sup>74</sup> Eventually it was decided to keep the daughters in the safety of the archducal palace, away from the French and, importantly, from Puylaurens.<sup>75</sup>

The Lorraine sisters and the local nobility were not alone in their dislike of Puylaurens. His prime concern in the Spanish Netherlands was to protect the favour of the duc d'Orléans not only as the source of his power but also because of his potentially uncertain position given his relatively humble background. The unassailable favour he enjoyed from Gaston together with his profound sense of social insecurity was a peculiar yet unfortunate combination in an individual clearly incapable of humility.<sup>76</sup> To Marie de' Medici, Puylaurens showed little more than cool disdain. One particular slight was reported to have left the queen mother in tears, while on another occasion she theatrically, though perhaps correctly, asserted that 'Monsieur preferred to his Mother, Puylaurens to be his help, his counsel, his Mother, Brother king, Heir and his all'.<sup>77</sup> He also succeeded in alienating other exiles, not least the duc d'Elbeuf, even though they had arrived in Brussels together. As the head of a noble House and a cadet member of the Guise family, Elbeuf had responsibilities to members of his family clan, yet Puylaurens did little to respect those interests or concerns; when Orléans and Puylaurens opened talks with Richelieu in 1633, it was reported, for instance, that Elbeuf's family in France contacted him expressing their anxiety that Gaston's negotiations were taking place without any reference to the security of other exiles, and more particularly to his own family interests.<sup>78</sup>

The extent of the hostility towards Puylaurens was violently demonstrated when on the evening of 3 May 1634 he was the victim of an assassination attempt on the steps of the archducal palace, an episode well-known in secondary literature. The shots missed, wounding two associates by his side. There was instant speculation about who was behind the attack; some suspected Père Chanteloupe, with Elbeuf's complicity, while others believed that Phalsbourg was involved. Eventually it was concluded that the culprit was a valet of Clausel, the former courier of the duc de Rohan and an associate of Chanteloupe and Elbeuf. The incident rapidly escalated into a more serious crisis, as a duel was set between Elbeuf and one of Puylaurens's supporters. While the dispute was eventually resolved, the heavy atmosphere of suspicion lingered at the archducal capital. Both Chanteloupe and Puylaurens were given protective guards for their personal safety, while Elbeuf was advised by the marquis of Aytona to withdraw temporarily from Brussels.<sup>79</sup>

This incident of extreme and open violence reflects the pervasive disorder that existed among the French exiles who surrounded the Bourbons in the Spanish Netherlands during the 1630s. While Marie de' Medici and Gaston (together with Puylaurens) negotiated fruitlessly with the Spanish, yet simultaneously treating with Louis XIII and Richelieu for their own settlements,

many of their followers could often do little but wait. What may have been a sense of boredom or political insecurity engendered by the negotiations with France, moreover, combined with an overt disregard for the indigenous nobility of the Spanish Netherlands, generating at times a tense atmosphere of bitter resentment from the local community. From the beginning of the archducal regime, the nobility of the Spanish Netherlands had identified themselves with the resident Habsburg court in Brussels, while sharing its moral and social customs, an aristocratic culture that was in marked contrast to that of the French exiles – Paul Henrard has gone so far as to contrast the comparatively severe ‘Spanish morals’ of the indigenous nobility with the less flattering ‘witty elegance and frivolousness [galanterie spirituelle et légèreté]’ of the French exiles.<sup>80</sup>

It would be misleading, however, to conclude that the French were united as a community in exile, or even that there were two power-blocks of exiles loyal either to Marie de’ Medici or Gaston, even though in broad terms they tended to oppose one another *en masse* and observers and historians have generally regarded them as two distinct and possibly unified groups.<sup>81</sup> The patterns of rivalry among the exiles were more complex as the entourages fragmented into self-interested sub-groups and individuals. Within the entourage of the queen mother individual exiles vied for influence, and there was barely veiled hostility towards Abbot Scaglia, the informal Spanish mediator. After all, while the abbot was working with the household of Marie de’ Medici, increasingly in opposition to those who supported Gaston, he was still perceived as an independent competitor for influence with his own political priorities as an exile from the duchy of Savoy. Scaglia faced a constant onslaught of accusations and rumours from almost all the French envoys sent from Brussels to Madrid, implying not only that his loyalty to Spain was in question but that he was actively involved in plots to destabilise the Spanish Netherlands. Puylaurens was always an irritant to Scaglia, though more strikingly Père Chanteloupe, desperate to establish himself as the queen mother’s leading advisor, repeatedly contradicted the reports Scaglia sent to Olivares in Spain. He furthermore instigated his own negotiations with Madrid to counter the efforts, and to damage the reputation, of the abbot as Spain’s point of contact between Marie de’ Medici and the count-duke.<sup>82</sup>

Madrid’s response to these accusations was measured. Scaglia had after all proved himself to be a valuable confidant of Olivares and he continued to be so for most of the 1630s – according to Echevarría-Bacigalupe, he was the last great seventeenth-century spy-master of the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>83</sup> More broadly, the abbot enjoyed a powerful advantage over French nationals in Brussels, for while he for one was generally immune from suspicion, even though he himself was from a foreign state, it seems that the Spanish never fully trusted the French exiles. To be sure, in a wider context this was always a potential risk of political exile. It obviously entailed geographical separation of individuals from their home states, but it did not necessarily result in

complete separation. Both Marie de' Medici and Gaston, after all, viewed temporary exile in the Spanish Netherlands primarily as a tool for securing political advantages in France, with the implication that their loyalties were not with their hosts.

Spain's mistrust of the French exiles in Brussels was undoubtedly compounded by the death on 1 December 1633 of the Infanta Isabella, a particular blow to the exiled Bourbons.<sup>84</sup> As widows and relatives, the Infanta and Marie de' Medici had enjoyed warm relations, a fact clearly demonstrated when the queen mother had first arrived in the Spanish Netherlands; as a female governess of the Spanish Netherlands, her presence had ensured that Gaston's own status as the highest ranking male member of a sovereign dynasty in Brussels was effectively unchallenged. Furthermore, her death ended the archducal experiment in the Spanish Netherlands that had been initiated in 1598 by Philip II. A council of ministers assumed responsibility headed by a Spaniard, the marquis of Aytona, though this arrangement was itself temporary and in November 1634 Philip IV's younger brother, the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand, arrived in the Spanish Netherlands in the wake of his spectacular military triumph at Nördlingen.<sup>85</sup>

The assumption by the Cardinal-Infante of the governor-generalship of the Spanish Netherlands further altered the relationship between the French exiles and their hosts in Brussels and Madrid. Prior to Ferdinand's arrival, Gaston had consented to a written agreement with the marquis of Aytona that he would not settle with his elder brother without informing the regime in Brussels or without the consent of his mother.<sup>86</sup> On the face of it the agreement guaranteed the continuation of Gaston's exile, acting as a re-assurance to the prince that the change in the governorship might not in fact diminish Spanish support. By the summer of 1634, however, there were few reasons for him to remain in the Spanish Netherlands, not least because he was apparently embarrassed by the imminent arrival of the Cardinal-Infante, a successful military commander and the brother of the king of Spain.<sup>87</sup> In October Gaston left exile, without apparently informing his mother or bride, and returned to France having settled with his elder brother.<sup>88</sup> His reconciliation package seemed generous; his appanage which had been sequestered was returned and he was granted the governorship of the Auvergne. Puylaurens was also rewarded, possibly for his part in bringing about the settlement and on the basis that he might persuade the prince to accept the annulment of the Lorraine marriage, even though previously he had been condemned to death and executed in effigy. Gaston's settlement named him as commander of the prince's personal troop of soldiers and Puylaurens more significantly obtained his longed-for social respectability through a marriage to one of Richelieu's 'nieces', a daughter of the baron de Pont-Chateau, and the grant of a *duché-pairie*.<sup>89</sup>

Gaston's departure from the Spanish Netherlands had a number of less beneficial consequences for those French nationals who remained in exile.

While the prince returned to France with his favourite, the *princesse d'Orléans* had to remain in Brussels pending the juridical decision over the legitimacy of their marriage, ensuring that the separated couple could not bear any sons. Marie de' Medici was also left behind, politically stranded and increasingly isolated in Brussels. Indeed, now that Gaston was gone there were few reasons for the queen mother to co-operate with the exiled Lorraine sisters – their immediate political value to Marie de' Medici as a means of influencing Orléans had significantly diminished. Almost immediately an icy atmosphere developed between the queen mother and both Margaret of Lorraine and the princess of Phalsbourg, while the queen mother also became alienated from Phalsbourg's allies, most notably the duc d'Elbeuf who of course shared a Guise affinity with the princess.<sup>90</sup>

The episode of Marie de' Medici and Gaston d'Orléans in the Spanish Netherlands was coming to its shabby conclusion. As relations between France and Spain deteriorated to the point of war, suspicions increased of the remaining French exiles in Brussels.<sup>91</sup> In response to the expulsion from the French court of the Spanish members of the entourage of Louis XIII's consort, Anne of Austria, French nationals were ordered to leave Brussels, save for a few named individuals such as Chanteloupe and Elbeuf.<sup>92</sup> Such was the sense of suspicion, if not paranoia, that surrounded even those who remained in the queen mother's household that in 1637 a search was ordered of the queen mother's residence for papers relating to secret negotiations with Richelieu. In an effort to minimise this perceived threat, the Spanish put further pressure on the queen mother to reduce the number of those French followers who were still in her entourage, and to replace them with more reliable Walloons.<sup>93</sup> The eventual expulsion of the remaining native Frenchmen from Marie de' Medici's household proved to be the trigger for her own departure. In 1638 she took a journey to Spa on the pretext of taking the waters; from there she slipped out of the Spanish Netherlands for the Dutch Republic and then by boat across the Channel to England and the court of Charles I and her daughter, Henrietta Maria.<sup>94</sup> The English king had spent most of the 1630s trying to persuade his mother-in-law not to seek refuge at his court, and her arrival was to his evident embarrassment – with few political assets, yet expensive to maintain as a former queen-consort, she had become little more than a liability in all senses.<sup>95</sup>

While her arrival in England caused embarrassment at the Caroline court, Marie de' Medici's departure from the Low Countries left a lingering sense of irritation and resentment in Brussels and Madrid. Philip IV declared that he would not tolerate her return to the Spanish Netherlands and he forthwith instructed his brother, the Cardinal-Infante, to ensure that Marie de' Medici should not have the opportunity of doing so again.<sup>96</sup> When the forlorn queen mother was forced to leave England at the outbreak of civil war in 1642, she returned to the continent, still as an exile from France. While she had earlier petitioned the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand (before his death)

for passage through the Spanish Netherlands, Marie de' Medici's request was coolly refused by the regime in Brussels; the Spanish did not want to countenance the possibility that she might remain there. Instead she travelled through the United Provinces on her journey to the Imperial city of Cologne, her last resting place in exile and life.

This was hardly an auspicious end for the queen mother when set against the spectacle of her arrival in Brussels in 1631. So much had been promised and yet so little had been achieved. Isabella for one had been evidently happy at the arrival of her cousin in 1631, and was also welcoming to Gaston when in the following year he returned to Brussels after the Montmorency rebellion. In the broader context of international power politics, the Spanish regime in Madrid saw in the exiled Bourbons the means for applying pressure on Richelieu in the immediate aftermath of the disastrous war in north Italy. Certainly, the queen mother and Gaston had played on these possibilities by seeking refuge in the Spanish Netherlands, a region that had a crucial function in early seventeenth-century international relations thanks to its particular geo-strategic advantages in northern Europe and a unique position within the collection of Habsburg territories. It was in one sense essential for them to have some political capital to offer Spain to ensure the support of Brussels and, more particularly, of Madrid. For both, however, the Spanish Netherlands had served as little more than a convenient and temporary refuge from which they had attempted to pursue interests fundamentally concerned with France. Exile for mother and son was court politics by another means, as it was more generally for other political exiles in early modern Europe. It was part of a process within the four-cornered relationship that inextricably bound them with Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu, threatening Richelieu's own position while leaving open the possibility of a return to political favour. This double identity was intrinsic to exile when viewed as a political process.

Yet exile was also a gamble, and the balance between risk and advantage was inherently uncertain. If the disgraced French had wished to influence Richelieu through their exile in the Spanish Netherlands, or even to force his removal, then exile had to be used with care. A degree of co-operation between Marie de' Medici, Gaston and their followers was essential for their success. Unfortunately, the one crucial thing they always lacked was any sense of mutual solidarity, and the inescapable image of the French exiles in the Spanish Netherlands is of disunity, factionalism and feuding, a fact that exasperated the regimes in Brussels and Madrid. As Alessandro Scaglia eloquently put it, 'if I were to write down what happened in one day it would be a history that would never end'.<sup>97</sup> Richelieu skilfully exploited these differences, negotiating the return of Gaston to France, dividing the prince from his wife, and effectively isolating the queen mother. In this light one conclusion seems inescapable. True enough, Gaston eventually managed to secure a reconciliation package with Puylaurens, and they continued to

generate problems after their return to France. Yet if anyone gained significantly from the exile of Marie de' Medici and the prince in the Spanish Netherlands then it was surely Cardinal Richelieu.

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### Notes

- 1 Jean Puget de la Serre, *L'entrée de la Reyne Mere du Roy Tres-Chrestien dans les villes des Pays Bas* (Antwerp, 1632), pp. 15–35.
- 2 H. Lonchay and J. Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle*, 6 vols (Brussels, 1923–37), II, 589–90; Archivio Segreto Vaticano Segretario di Stato (hereafter ASV SS) Fiandra, 18, fol. 200–v, Consa to Barberini, 2 August 1631. It should be added that some ministers in Brussels initially expressed their enthusiasm at the arrival of the queen mother. ASV SS Fiandra, 20, fol. 289–v, Consa to Barberini, 16 August 1631.
- 3 Quintin Aldea Vaquero (ed.), *España y Europa en el siglo XVII. Correspondencia de Saavedra Fajardo: 1631–1633*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1986), I, 22.
- 4 Archivo General de Simancas Sección de Estado y Guerra (hereafter AGS Est.) 2574, 'Lo que se ofrece', c. spring 1631; K1415, 57, consulta of council of state, 13 June 1631; 2045, 45, consulta of council of state, 5 August 1631; ASV SS Fiandra 18, fol. 200–v, Consa to Barberini, 2 August 1631.
- 5 AGS Est. 2045, 57, consulta of council of state, 26 July 1631; K1665, 50, secret instructions for Scaglia, spring 1631; Romolo Quazza, *La guerra per la successione di Mantova e del Monferrato, 1628–1631*, 2 vols (Mantua, 1926), II, 317. See also Archivio di Stato Torino (hereafter AST) Lettere Ministri Spagna m. 24, fasc. 1, 17, Scaglia to Victor Amadeus, 26 February 1631; Ventura Ginarte Gonzalez, *El conde de la Roca, 1583–1658. Un diplomatico extremeño en Italia* (Madrid, undated), pp. 184–5; L. J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 264–5.
- 6 AGS Est. 2519, 139, consulta of council of state, 20 November 1631. See also 2045, 78, consulta of council of state, 30 November 1631.
- 7 Ernest Gossart, *L'auberge des princes en exil: anecdotes de la cour de Bruxelles aux XVIIe siècle* (Brussels, 1905); Paul Henrard, *Marie de Médicis dans les Pays-Bas, 1631–1638* (Antwerp, 1875).
- 8 Michel Carmona, *Marie de Médicis* (Paris, 1981); Georges Dethan, *La vie de Gaston d'Orléans* (Paris, 1992).
- 9 Consult Werner Thomas and Luc Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella: Essays* (Brussels, 1998). Patricia Haskell's doctoral thesis did at least try to argue for the significance of the Spanish Netherlands in Caroline strategic calculations: 'Sir Francis Windebank and the personal rule of Charles I' (Southampton PhD. thesis, 1975).
- 10 José Alcalá-Zamora y Quiépo de Llano, *España, flandes y el mar del norte, 1618–1639* (Barcelona, 1975), p. 191.
- 11 Public Record Office London State Papers (hereafter PRO SP) 94/36/250, Hopton to Coke, 7 March 1633; 94/36/333, Hopton to Coke, 23 September 1633; PRO SP 94/37/26, Hopton to Weston, 25 April 1634.

- 12 Archives Générales du Royaulme Brussels Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre (hereafter AGR SEG) 59, fol. 229, Scaglia to Olivares, 22 November 1635; 598, fol. 22v, Scaglia to Philip IV, 17 June 1636. See also Maria Montañez Matilla, *El correo en la España de los Austrias* (Barcelona, 1953), pp. 101–109; Miguel Angel Echevarría Bacigalupe, *La diplomacia secreta en flandes, 1598–1643* (Leioia, 1984), pp. 54–7; Alcalá-Zamora, *Mar del norte*, pp. 355–7, 363–4.
- 13 Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, pp. 227, 282–4; AGR SEG 596, fol. 10–v, Scaglia to Olivares, 12 August 1632; Vittorio Siri, *Memorie recondite dall'anno 1601 sino al 1640*, 8 vols (Lyon, 1677–79), VII, 530–31, 567. When Courmenin was captured, Scaglia appealed to the English to save him. PRO SP 77/22/99, Scaglia to Vane, 8 September 1632. Clausel had followed the queen mother to Brussels, unable it seems to reconcile himself to Richelieu, as Rohan had done, and while in exile Scaglia had served as a broker between him and the Spanish regime. AGR SEG 596, fol. 7, Scaglia to Olivares, 19 January 1633. The queen mother sent Clausel to Rohan in an effort to entice the duke into opposition against the cardinal. As a gesture of loyalty to the crown, Rohan arrested his former client and Richelieu had him put to death. J. A. Clarke, *Huguenot Warrior: The Life and Times of Henri de Rohan, 1579–1638* (The Hague, 1966), p. 201.
- 14 Jean Dumont (ed.), *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens, un recueil des traités d'alliance depuis le règne de Charlemagne jusues à présent*, 8 vols (Amsterdam, 1726–31), V, part I, 573–4, 'conditions sous lesquelles les Pays-Bas sont cedez à Isabelle-Claire-Eugenie d'Autriche par Philipe II', 6 May 1598.
- 15 Rafael Valladares, 'La Monarquía Hispánica y el problema de los Países Bajos', in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, pp. 47–54.
- 16 It should be reiterated that the marriage act made careful provision for the return of the Spanish Netherlands to the sovereign control of the king of Spain in the event of its conditions being unfulfilled. Dumont (ed.), *Corps diplomatiques*, V, part I, 573–4.
- 17 Hugo de Schepper, 'Les archducs et les institutions du gouvernement au Pays-Bas espagnols, 1596–1621', in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, pp. 224, 228.
- 18 Asunción Retortillo Atienza, 'Poder e influencia de Ambrogio Spínola en la corte de los archiduques (1602–1607)', in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, pp. 233–240.
- 19 Dumont (ed.), *Corps diplomatiques*, V, part I, 574.
- 20 G. Parker, 'The Decision-making Process in the Government of the Catholic Netherlands under the "Archdukes", 1596–1621', in his collection *Spain and the Netherlands* (Glasgow, 1990 ed.), pp. 164–76; De Schepper, 'Les archducs', in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, pp. 221–31; Charles H. Carter, 'Belgian "Autonomy" under the Archdukes, 1598–1621', *Journal of Modern History*, 36 (1964), 245–59.
- 21 Gary Bell, *A Handlist of British diplomatic representatives, 1509–1688* (London, 1990), pp. 265–71. Spanish ambassadors were also despatched to Brussels in this period. Joseph Lefèvre, 'Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne à Bruxelles sous le règne de l'archduc Albert (1598–1621)', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 2 (1923), 61–80.
- 22 WernerThomas, 'Andromeda Unbound: The Reign of Albert and Isabella in the

- Southern Netherlands, 1598–1621’, in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, p. 6; Dumont (ed.), *Corps diplomatiques*, V, part I, 575–6.
- 23 Pauline Croft, ‘Brussels and London: the Archdukes, Robert Cecil and James I’, in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, p. 82. See also J. Cuvelier, ‘Les préliminaires du traité de Londres (29 août 1604)’, *Revue Belge de philologie et d’histoire*, 2 (1923), 279–304.
- 24 The timing of the truce also had much to do with the fortuitous arrival of two silver fleets to Spain, raising fears among the Dutch that Spínola would build on his military successes of 1604. I am grateful to Professor Patrick Williams of Portsmouth University for this point.
- 25 For example Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1601–1661* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 299–314. In a lesser known example, Abbot Scaglia, an informal confidant of Olivares, communicated with Prince Frederick Henry and his secretary Constantijn Huygens between 1634 and 1636 to test their opinion about a settlement of the conflict. AGR SEG 598, fols 16–19, Scaglia to Olivares, 5 June 1636; fol. 171–v, Scaglia to Huygens, 7 June 1636; fol. 199–v, Scaglia to Huygens, 27 December 1636.
- 26 On English exiles see Albert Loomie, *The Spanish Elizabethans: The English Exiles at the Court of Philip II* (Fordham, 1963); Robert Lechat, *Les réfugiés anglais dans les Pays Bas espagnols durant le règne d’Elisabeth, 1558–1603* (Louvain, 1914).
- 27 See for example, T. J. Walsh, *The Irish Continental College Movement: The Colleges at Bordeaux, Lille and Toulouse* (Dublin and Cork, 1973), pp. 61–70. I am grateful to Professor Alan Ford of Nottingham University for advice on this topic.
- 28 Paul Arblaster, ‘The Archdukes and the Northern Counter-Reformation’, in Thomas and Duerloo (eds), *Albert and Isabella*, pp. 90–1. However, Walsh suggests that the financial plight of the Irish colleges in the Spanish Netherlands at least during the seventeenth century was in fact precarious. Walsh, *Irish Continental College Movement*, pp. 66–7.
- 29 *Declaration de la Reyne Mere du Roy tres-Chrestien contenant les raisons de sa sortie des pays-bas* (London, 1638), p. 3. See also ‘Tres-humble, tres-veritable et tres-importante remonstrance au Roy’, in Abbé de S. Germain (ed.), *Diverses pieces pour la defense de la Reyne Mere du Roy Tres-Chrestien Louys XIII*, (Antwerp, 1632 ed.), p. 64; Gossart, *L’auberge des princes*, pp. 9–10. It should be added that the queen mother also made it clear that she did not intend remaining in the Spanish Netherlands.
- 30 ‘Lettre de Chanteloupe aux nouvelles chambres de justice’, in S. Germain (ed.), *Diverses pieces* (Antwerp, 1644 ed.), p. 5.
- 31 On Thomas Carignano consult Romolo Quazza, *Tommaso di Savoia-Carignano nelle campagne di Fiandra e di Francia, 1635–1638* (Turin, 1941). For the other exiles see Gossart, *L’auberge des princes*, *passim*.
- 32 For example, Eveline Cruikshanks and Edward Corp (eds), *The Stuart Court in Exile and the Jacobites* (London, 1995); Edward Gregg, ‘Monarchs without a Crown’, in Robert Oresko, Graham Gibbs and Hamish Scott (eds), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 382–422.
- 33 For a recent account of Mazarin during the Frondes consult Orest Ranum, *The*

- Fronde: A French revolution, 1648–1652* (New York, 1993), especially pp. 335–41 on his second exile and the collapse of the revolt.
- 34 During the ministry of Richelieu, the third son of the duc d' Epernon remained faithful to the cardinal while the second son was consistently opposed to Richelieu during the 1630s. Vicomte de Noailles, *Le Cardinal de la Valette, général des armées du roi, 1635 à 1639* (Paris, 1906). For the parallel example of the Condé during the ministry of Cardinal Mazarin see J. J. Inglis-Jones, 'The Grand Condé: Power Politics in France, Spain and the Spanish Netherlands, 1652–9' (Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1994).
- 35 For further information consult my thesis, 'The Diplomatic Career of Abbot Scaglia during the Thirty Years' War' (Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1996), chapters four and five.
- 36 AGS Est. 2051, 142, 'Memorial de los mas principales de la Casa de la Reina Madre y de los demas del seguito, como de los criados que tiene cada uno por sí', undated.
- 37 PRO SP 77/24/130v, Gerbier to Coke, April 1634.
- 38 Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 574–5; Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, pp. 42, 155–6.
- 39 Jean-Marie Constant, *Les conjurateurs. Le premier libéralisme politique sous Richelieu* (1987), pp. 80–1.
- 40 Puget de la Serre, *L'entrée de la Reyne Mere*, pp. 19 and 68, where the author writes of the 'Royal presence' of the Infanta and the queen mother; Gossart, *L'auberge des princes*, chapter 3. The royal connotations of closed crowns in iconography has been discussed by Robert Oresko, 'The House of Savoy in Search of a Royal Crown', in Gibbs, Oresko and Scott (eds), *Royal and Republican Sovereignty*, pp. 279–80.
- 41 The queen mother for one expressed her wish to travel from the Spanish Netherlands to the English court repeatedly during the 1630s. For example, Albert J. Loomie (ed.), *Ceremonies of Charles I: The Notebooks of John Finet, 1628–1641* (Fordham, 1987), pp. 120, 127.
- 42 Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, I, 631, 658; AGR SEG 600, Scaglia to Philip IV, June 1632.
- 43 *Advis de ce qui s'est passé sur le sujet d'une lettre présentée au Roy tres-Chrestien de la part de la Royne Mere de sa Majesté*, in S. Germain (ed.), *Diverses pieces* (1632 ed.), pp. 601–2. See also Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, chapters 3 and 4; Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VIII, 276–81.
- 44 Inglis-Jones, 'The Grand Condé', pp. 116–124; Gossart, *L'auberge des princes*, chapter 8. The problems of ceremonial precedence generated by members of sovereign families visiting other sovereign courts might be one significant reason for the relatively low incidence of such visits in this period.
- 45 He had of course been in the Spanish Netherlands between January and May 1632 following the treaty of Vic and his departure from his refuge in Lorraine. Dethan, *Gaston d'Orléans*, chapter 9.
- 46 Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 580.
- 47 For an abbreviated description of Gaston's entourage see PRO SP 77/22/268, 'Liste de ceux de qualité de la suite de Monsieur de Duc d'Orléans', November 1632.
- 48 Perhaps significantly, the *Saint Esprit* stripped from Elbeuf was subsequently given to his younger brother, the comte d' Harcourt, who remained in France, reflecting

- how the exile of a member of a family did not necessarily spell political disaster for the entire clan. Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 596.
- 49 Constant, *Les conjurateurs*, pp. 80–1.
- 50 Claude de Bourdeille, *Mémoires de monsieur de Montresor* (Cologne, 1664), p. 3.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 52 This had been outlined by Philip IV in a letter to the abbot, in which he also asked Scaglia to inform him and his ministers of any information that he considered to be relevant. AGS Est. K1415, 82, Philip IV to Scaglia, 12 May 1632.
- 53 PRO SP 77/25/338v, Gerbier to Coke, 21 December 1635.
- 54 AGR SEG 596, fol. 277, Scaglia to Philip IV, 12 September 1633; PRO SP 77/23/38v, Gerbier to Coke, 12 February 1633. See also AGR SEG 596, fol. 176, Scaglia to Olivares, 19 March 1633; 597, fol. 75, Scaglia to Olivares, 11 May 1634. The papal inter-nuncio in Brussels commented on the incessant duelling among followers of Gaston, for instance, ASV SS Fiandra, 19, fol. 105, Consa to Barberini, 11 May 1632.
- 55 ASV SS Fiandra 19, fol. 296, Consa to Barberini, 30 November 1632; Montresor, *Mémoires*, pp. 6–7; Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, p. 313.
- 56 See the comments in Carmona, *Marie de Médicis*, p. 464.
- 57 For instance, AGR SEG 208, Scaglia to Philip IV, 21 May 1633; 597, Scaglia to Philip IV, 1 April 1634. In order to counter this, or perhaps to prevent either of them settling with Paris, the regime in Madrid expressed a wish that both the mother and son should agree not to make any unilateral agreements. Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, II, 718. The course of Marie de' Medici's talks, which included the possibility of her settling in Florence, can be followed in Siri, *Memorie recondite*, vol. VII, *passim*.
- 58 AGR SEG 221, fol. 161–v, Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV, 24 February 1639.
- 59 AGS Est. K1416 31, consulta of council of state, July 1633. 2151, Olivares to Philip IV, 1 July 1633.
- 60 As soon as he arrived in Brussels, Orléans was expressing his interest in organising another revolt. AGR SEG 600, Scaglia to Olivares, 29 December 1632.
- 61 ASV SS Fiandra 18, fol. 289–v, Consa to Barberini, 16 August 1631; Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, II, 617; AGR SEG 597, fol. 83, Scaglia to Philip IV, 16 May 1634.
- 62 AGR SEG 600, Scaglia to Olivares, 14 October 1632; PRO SP 77/24/65v, Gerbier to Weston, 24 February 1634.
- 63 On the policy objectives of the Savoyard duke see AST Lettere Ministri Milano m. 18, 'Registro delle lettere del Duca', Victor Amadeus to Scaglia, 28 July 1631. See also AGS Est. 3646, 30, Victor Amadeus to Philip IV, 14 April 1631.
- 64 Constant, *Les conjurateurs*, pp. 18–25.
- 65 Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, p. 372.
- 66 Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 669–70. The only biographical work of any substance on the Princess of Phalsbourg is Alfred de Besancenet, 'Henriette de Vaude-ment, Princesse de Phalsbourg', *Revue de l'Est (l'Austrasie)*, 25 (November–December 1866), 267–86. See also Dethan, *Gaston*, pp. 373–81; Gossart, *L'auberge des princes*, chapter 6.
- 67 Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, II, 706; AGR SEG 597, fol. 83, Scaglia to Olivares, 16 May 1634; Calendar of State Papers Venetian (hereafter CSPV) 1632–6, p. 147.

- 68 Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 708–9.
- 69 *Ibid.*, VII, 693–4; De Bourdeille, *Mémoires*, p. 37.
- 70 AGS Est. 2048, 53, consulta of council of state, 16 October 1634.
- 71 AGR SEG 596, fol. 163, Scaglia to Olivares, 24 February 1633; ASV SS Fiandra 21, fols 92v–5, Consa to Barberini, 9 March 1633.
- 72 PRO SP 77/23/119v–120, Gerbier to Coke, 26 March 1633.
- 73 On Charles Arenberg and his family consult the bibliography in Paul Janssens and Luc Duerloo, *Armorial de la Noblesse Belge du XVe siècle au XXe siècle*, 4 vols (Brussels, 1992).
- 74 PRO SP 77/23/124–5v, Gerbier to Coke, 31 March 1633.
- 75 AGR SEG 596, fols 180v–3v, Scaglia to Olivares, 4 April 1633; AGS Est. 2151, Scaglia to Olivares, 25 May 1633; Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, pp. 319–23; AGR SEG 596, fol. 185, Scaglia to Olivares, April (?) 1634. However, the problem resurfaced in 1636 when Gerbier reported an ‘uncivil ball’ of naked exiles had taken place below the apartments of the daughters at Tournai, leading to a duel. PRO SP 77/26/177, Gerbier to Coke, 30 May 1636.
- 76 As Montresor noted, ‘il n’estoit pas homme à se soubmettre à un autre’. *Mémoires*, p. 7.
- 77 PRO SP 77/24/13v–14, Gerbier to Coke, 20 January 1634; 77/24/75v–76, Gerbier to Coke, 3 March 1634.
- 78 AGR SEG 596, fol. 202, Scaglia to Philip IV, 25 May 1633.
- 79 AGR SEG 597, fols 77–8, Scaglia to Philip IV, 11 May 1634; De Bourdeille, *Mémoires*, pp. 30–7, 142–9; Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VIII, 75–80; Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, pp. 428–30.
- 80 AGR SEG 596, fol. 202, Scaglia to Olivares, 25 May 1633; fol. 180v, Scaglia to Olivares, 4 April 1633; Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, p. 318; Gossart, *L’auberge des princes*, pp. 41–2.
- 81 For example, AGR SEG 597, fol. 92, Scaglia to Olivares, 15 June 1634.
- 82 On the numerous attempts to discredit Scaglia see, for instance, AGS Est. K1424, 88, note of Lingendes to Olivares, April 1633; 108, memorial of Lingendes for Philip IV, 25 July 1633; PRO SP 77/24/244, Gerbier to Coke, 9 June 1634; 77/24/269, Gerbier to Coke, 23 June 1634.
- 83 Echevarría Bacigalupe, *Diplomacia secreta*, p. 238.
- 84 CSPV 1632–6, 174; Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 707.
- 85 For an account of the Cardinal-Infante’s governorship consult A. Van der Essen, *Le Cardinal-Infant et la politique européenne de l’Espagne* (Brussels, 1944).
- 86 Marie de’ Medici had also been instrumental in negotiating the agreement. For a text of the agreement see Dumont (ed.), *Corps diplomatiques*, VI, part I, 73.
- 87 De Bourdeille, *Mémoires*, p. 38. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 36–7 on his growing dissatisfaction with the Spanish.
- 88 CSPV 1632–6, 289.
- 89 Dumont (ed.), *Corps diplomatiques*, VI, part I, 73–4; Siri, *Memorie recondite*, VII, 393; Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, III, 27, 32, 56; De Bourdeille, *Mémoires*, pp. 41–2. Though of course Puylaurens’s failure to obtain his part of the bargain led to him being imprisoned; he was to die in suspicious circumstances while in prison. De Bourdeille, *Mémoires*, pp. 51–6; Constant, *Les conjurateurs*, pp. 96–9.
- 90 For some examples see PRO SP 77/25/14, Gerbier to Coke, 2 February 1635;

- AGR SEG 597, fols 203v–4, Scaglia to Olivares, 17 February 1635; 212, fol. 537, Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV, 15 May 1635.
- 91 See the comments in AGR SEG 597, fols 190v–191, paper of Scaglia, 10 December 1634; PRO SP 77/25/2, Gerbier to Coke, 12 January 1635. Of course the suspicion that spies were present among the exiles was there from the start. AGR SEG 600, Scaglia to Olivares, 27 November 1632.
- 92 AGR SEG 213, fol. 269, Philip IV to Cardinal-Infante, 30 November 1635; Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, III, 77, 79.
- 93 CSPV 1636–9, 261–2.
- 94 *Declaration de la Reyne Mere du Roys tres-Chrestien, contenant les raisons de sa sortie des pais-bas* (London, 1638), pp. 3–4; AGR SEG 520, fol. 45, Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV, 1638.
- 95 CSPV 1636–9, 445–6. Though the queen mother’s apologist produced another publication to mark her arrival in England, and her continuing importance: Jean Puget de la Serre, *Histoire de l’entree de la reine Mere dans la Grande Bretagne* (London, 1639).
- 96 Lonchay and Cuvelier (eds), *Correspondance*, III, 337–8; She arrived in England from the Dutch Republic on 18 October 1638. Loomie (ed.), *Ceremonies*, p. 253.
- 97 AGR SEG 597, fol. 75, Scaglia to Olivares, 11 May 1634.

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