- Format: Paperback
- ISBN: 978-1-5261-1883-7
- Pages: 176
- Publisher: Manchester University Press
RRP £18.99, NOW £18.99
- Published Date: February 2017
- BIC Category: European history, Colonialism & imperialism, HISTORY / Europe / Great Britain, Humanities / Colonialism & imperialism, History, United Kingdom, Great Britain
- Series: Studies in Imperialism
This book offers new insight into the end of the British Empire in the Middle East. It takes a fresh look at the relationship between Britain and the Gulf rulers at the height of the British Empire, and how its effects are still felt internationally today.
Over the last four decades, the Persian Gulf region has gone through oil shocks, wars and political changes, and yet the basic entities of the southern Gulf states have remained largely in place. Drawing on extensive multi-archival research in the British, American and Gulf archives, this book illuminates a series of negotiations between British diplomats and the Gulf rulers that inadvertently led Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE to take their current shapes. The story addresses the crucial question of self-determination versus 'better together', a dilemma pertinent to anyone interested in the transformation of the modern world.
'Sato has written an important book that is readily accessible to non-specialists and the broader public and deserves a wide readership among the policy-making community, both in Britain and in the Gulf. At a time when the phrase 'east of Suez' has re-entered the British government lexicography and Britain has returned to permanent military bases in the Gulf for the first time since 1971, Sato's reassessment of Britain's regional withdrawal holds particular resonance.'
Shohei Sato is Associate Professor in International History at Kanazawa University, Japan
Winner of the Japan Consortium for Area Studies Award (Toryu-sho category) 2016
1. 'Pirates' turned sovereign states, 1819-1964
2. Labour's clinging on to the Gulf, 1964-1967
3. Jenkins and the withdrawal decision, 1968
4. Dilemmas and delay, 1968-1970
5. The 'secret' agreement, July 1971
6. Formal sovereignty and continuing collaboration, 1972